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PREFACE 
This study attempts to show how Americans in general 
remembered the Vietnam War from 1975 to 1985, the decade 
after it ended. The focus of the study is history in the 
popular realm, including novels as well as nonfiction, 
poetry, plays, movies, television shows, articles in 
political journals, history in the political arena, songs, 
memorials, public opinion polls and more. Most everything 
but academic history is examined. As a kind of social 
history, the study seeks to determine the nature and 
influence of popular historical memory. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE PUBLIC FORGETS THE WAR 
Wanting To Forget The War 
When Saigon fell to the North Vietnamese on April 30, 
1975, and the Vietnam War finally ended, Americans began 
viewing the long, divisive episode through historical 
lenses. Indeed, for the United States the war was history 
in 1975, for the Paris accords of 1973 had ended America's 
combat role in Indochina and arranged for the return of her 
prisoners of war. Their emotional homecoming was perhaps 
the only thing resembling a clear and satisfying conclusion. 
Having put the war behind them two years before, Americans 
were now in a position to be historical. In assessing the 
war and what went wrong, both political observers and 
ordinary citizens spoke with a trace of distance in their 
voice, reflecting not just the chronological distance 
between the Paris settlement and the fall of Saigon but also 
the physical and even spiritual one between war-torn Vietnam 
and the peaceful United States. They spoke with disgust and 
embarrassment as well, from the right, the left, the middle 
and the undefined. 
1 
On the left, Irving Howe, editor of Dissent magazine, 
called the American role in Saigon's last days "squalid," 
bringing to an "ugly culmination a history of confusion, 
deceit, stupidity, crime. "I Howe's strong language was 
matched by other critics of the war. Frances Fitzgerald, 
author of Fire In The Lake, the award-winning history of 
Vietnam, said, "The rigidity and stupidity of American 
2 
policy in Indochina has entirely to do with the fact that no 
American president has ever really cared what happened to 
Indochina." Referring to Richard Nixon and his advisers, 
Fitzgerald added that the war had dragged on "because a few 
cynical men wished to prove themselves right and to retain 
their old authority with the American public. ,,1 Stanley 
Karnow, a journalist who covered the war and would later 
write its best-selling popular history, said he could not 
believe that the United States, a nation of moral 
principles, had been responsible for "one of the major human 
d · f d t' ,,3 trage ~es 0 mo ern ~mes. Several commentators used the 
I Irving Howe, "Vietnam: The Sorrow and the Pity," 
Dissent (Summer 1975), 213. 
2 Frances Fitzgerald, "The End is The Beginning," New 
Republic, 3 May 1975, 8. 
3 Stanley Karnow, "Grand Illusion," ibid., 8. 
word "evil" to describe American policies in Vietnam. 4 
Other descriptions were "moral and intellectual poverty"; 
"the arrogance of might" and "the arrogance of 
righteousness"; "stupid, tragic"; and policies conducted 
"madly. ,,5 
3 
For very different reasons the political right also saw 
the war as wretched and decadent. Writing in the National 
Review, one of the leading conservative journals, Anthony 
Bouscaren quoted an American businessman in Saigon who 
called the United States "a simpering, defeatist, 
isolationist nation": 
The damage done to America by the Vietnam debacle is 
inestimable. It is going to work a spell on America for 
25 years. America is going into a national eclipse, and 
it is going that way willingly. It is bad enough for me 
personally to leave a place where I had planned to build 
a life. I don't expect anyone to give a damn about 
that. But Americas has lost its honor, and no one cares 
about that either. 
4 "On The Disaster," ibid., and Jeffrey Race, "The 
Unlearned Lessons of Vietnam," Yale Review (December 1976), 
162. 
5 Hans Morgenthau, "The Elite Protects Itself," New 
Republic, 3 May 1975, 21; National Council of Churches, 
"Cleanse Us Of Arrogance," Christian Centur~, 7 May 
1975, 462; David Halberstam, "Why It Never Worked," 
Newsweek, 14 April 1975, 3; Anthony Lewis, "Hubris, 
National and Personal," New Republic, 3 May 1975, 17. 
6 Anthony Bouscaren, "All Quiet on the Eastern Front," 
National Review, 20 June 1975, 660. 
4 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sounded a similar theme, 
describing Congressional action toward South Vietnam in 
terms of abandonment and wondering what- that said about 
American credibility.? Navy Commander Richard Stratton, who 
spent six years in Vietnam and two months in a North 
Vietnamese prison, said: 
America's disengagement was inevitable, but the manner 
in which we did it was embarrassing. I certainly 
thought we owed it to the Vietnamese to show a little 
more class than that. We led them down the primrose 
path and left them hanging on the end of the limb. Then 
we sawed it off. So why should we be surprised when 
we see them fall? As for me, I did everything I could. 
I can face myself in the mirror. I don't know how many 
other tmericans like Jane Fonda can say the same 
thing. 
While public opinion of the war was diverse, most 
Americans were anxious to consign the event to history. A 
Gallup poll conducted in March 1975, when the North 
Vietnamese began their final, victorious drive, showed that 
78 percent of those asked were against further aid to South 
Vietnam. In April, when President Gerald Ford requested 
$300 million in emergency aid from Congress and was denied, 
75 percent told Gallup they were against Ford's request. 9 
Americans regretted the collapse of South Vietnam, but 
Department of State Bulletin, 28 April 1975, 548. 
8 Time, "Opinions of U.S. Warmakers, 12 May 1795, 23. 
9 Martin Arnold, "Hawks and Doves Glad It's Ending," New 
York Times, 20 April 1975, section I, p. 3. 
5 
Congressmen heard little support in their districts for 
trying to save a lost cause. Don Bonker, a Democrat from 
Washington, said, "People are drained. They want to bury 
the memory of Indochina."lO Republican Garner Shriver of 
Kansas spoke for many when he said, "The feeling is that 
we've made a considerable contribution to Cambodia and South 
Vietnam and that we've done enough. ,,11 
The most succinct expression may have come from Abner 
Mikva, a Democratic Cong~cssman from suburban Chicago, who 
noted Americans "want to pull the oceans over their 
heads."l' They wanted, in other words, to forget there was 
such a place as Vietnam. They wanted to forget that 
Americans had fought there for eight years, that some 58,000 
had died, that 270,000 had been wounded, that the United 
States had spent so much blood and bile in fighting and 
arguing the war. Said a badly wounded Marine, "For the 
American public this will be forgotten. Just like a bad 
dream ... 13 
Heeding public sentiment, President Ford gave a speech 
at Tulane University on April 23, 1975, in which he declared 
10 Time, 14 April 1975, 22. 
1l Ibid. 
12 Newsweek, 28 April 1975, 12. 
13 Ibid. 
6 
the Vietnam War to be over for the United States. His 
declaration drew enthusiastic applause from the audience. 
Ford called for "a great national reconciliation," saying, 
"Today America can regain the sense of pride that existed 
before Vietnam. But it cannot be achieved by refighting a 
war that is finished--as far as America is concerned."l( At 
a news conference several weeks later, Ford repeated 
himself, saying, "The war is over. It was sad and tragic in 
many respects. I think it would be unfortunate for us to 
rehash allegations as to individuals who might be to blame, 
or Administrations that might be at fault. 
that it's over, we ought to look ahead. 
It seems to me 
" 15 
Ford thus set the tone for the postwar debate. The war 
itself, its political history and detail, would in fact be 
debated hardly at all. America would instead brush herself 
off, stride toward her bicentennial in 1976 and try to learn 
what she could from the Vietnam experience. How could 
learning take place without debate? The unspoken idea was 
to view the episode pragmatically, keeping it in the back of 
the mind, not dwelling on it and continuing to succumb to 
its poisons. In the much-remarked national manner, 
Americans would look to the future, not the past. There 
14 New York Times, 24 April 1975, section I, p. 19. 
15 Ibid., 7 May 1975, section I, p. 20. 
7 
would be healing and a minimum of recriminations. This was 
implied in Ford's "great national reconciliation." 
Appropriately, his memoirs were entitled A Time To Heal, 
referring to both the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal 
which made him president. 
As 1975 came to a close, so did the war in the American 
memory, for a time, anyway. Once the flood of postmortems 
had been issued by politicians, statesmen, newspaper 
columnists and various pundits, one saw or heard very little 
about the war. President Ford barely mentioned it in his 
1976 State of the Union address,16 and it was not a topic of 
discussion in the presidential campaign of that year. 
Columnist Joseph Kraft noted how the war was conspicous by 
its absence from the campaign, saying Ford and his eventual 
Democratic opponent, Jimmy Carter, were practicing "the 
politics of reassurance." By running as an outsider to 
Washington, Carter, said Kraft, implied the war was yet 
another mess stirred up in the capital, not a national 
creation. For his part, Ford was fond of quoting Dwight 
16 Committee on House Administration, U.S. House of 
Representatives, The Presidential Campaign of 1976 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 
179. 
8 
Eisenhower: "America is great because America is good." 11 
Neither party's platform mentioned the war, except for brief 
references to assisting Vietnam veterans. 18 
The war resurfaced in January 1977 when President Jimmy 
Carter's first executive action was to pardon those who 
evaded the Vietnam draft, making good on a campaign promise. 
In an interview the year before, Carter had spoken 
thoughtfully of those who had served in the war and those 
who had managed to avoid it. Said Carter: 
In the area of the country where I live, defecting 
from military service is almost unheard of. Most of the 
young people in my section of Georgia are quite poor. 
They didn't know how to get to Canada, they didn't have 
enough money to hide in college. They thought this war 
was wrong. They preferred to stay home, but still they 
went to Vietnam .••• It's very difficult for me to 
equate what they did to what the young people did who 
left the country. So for a long time it was hard for me 
to address the question in objective fashion, but I 
think it's time to get the Vietnam War over with ••.• 
I don't have the desire to punish anyone. I'd just like 
to tell the young folks who did defect to come home, 
with no requirement that you be punished or that you 
serve in some humanitarian capacity or ~nything. Just 
come back home, the whole thing's over. 
Carter's pardon angered some, but like the war it was soon 
forgotten. Like his predecessor, Carter spoke of healing, 
11 Joseph Kraft, "Campaign Cop-Out," Washington Post, 4 
April 1976, section III, p. 7. 
18 Donald B. Johnson, ed., National Party Platforms, vol. 
1 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1978), 928:979. 
19 Washington Post, 22 January 1977, section I, p. 1. 
9 
of putting the bad memories to rest. 
Through the late 1970s and into the eighties, certain 
aspects of the Vietnam War briefly held the public's 
attention. In his book The Unfinished War, Walter Capps 
showed how on most any given day a war-related topic could 
be found in the mass media. For example, on September 16, 
1981, the Los Angeles Times carried a story about a new 
television film called Fly Away Angel, which its producer 
described as "an objective look at the war as if it had been 
fought one thousand years ago, as if I was writing a drama 
about the Trojan War." In the Times on the same day was 
news of a Vietnam veteran's suicide. On the day before his 
funeral there was news of a demonstration outside the 
Veterans Administration hospital which had treated the 
victim, whom, the demonstrators felt, had died because "the 
VA was unresponsive and irresponsible." The same week, 
People magazine ran a story about David Christian, who at 18 
had become the Army's youngest second lieutenant to graduate 
from Officer's Candidate School and who, upon being disabled 
by napalm burns in Vietnam, became the Army's youngest 
retired captain at 21. Christian then launched a drive for 
Vietnam veterans' rights. 20 
20 Walter Capps, The Unfinished War (Boston: Beacon Hill 
Press, 1982), 2-4. 
10 
David Christian's story and most others about the war 
were notable for their human interest, but also for their 
lack of political history. Hollywood and to a lesser extent 
the publishing industry produced Vietnam stories that were 
usually personal, fictitious or both, and the number of 
these were at first a trickle, for years would pass before 
the war became an acceptable subject. Upon receiving the 
first draft of an American veteran's tale, one literary 
agent remembered thinking, "Vietnam--oh, God, I don't need 
this. How do I go about turning it down?"ZI If personal 
versions were a trickle, objective histories, even popular 
works, were a mere drip. Americans, it seemed, liked a good 
story and Vietnam stories were no exception, but few were 
interested in the war itself. They were drawn to the 
personal struggles of a David Christian, but not to the 
politics of his war. From 1975 to 1985 only two general 
histories made their mark: Vietnam: A History, by Stanley 
Karnow, a long, journalistic account which accompanied a 
Public Broadcasting series on the war; and America's Longest 
War, by historian George Herring, a concise, academic 
account which became the standard college text. There were, 
of course, many other works, but most were specialized and 
21 David Gelman, "Vietnam Marches Home," Newsweek, 13 
February 1978, 86. 
11 
did not reach a wide audience. Karnow's and Herring's works 
did reach many, Karnow's selling 350,000 copies by 1985, but 
neither was a publishing phenomenon. 22 They hardly filled 
the void of Vietnam War history. 
Proof of the void's existence was to be found in public 
opinion surveys, classrooms and even the White House. A 
poll by the New York Times, commmissioned for the tenth 
anniversary of the war's end in 1985, showed that two out of 
five Americans could not identify South Vietnam as our 
ally.23 James Matray, a historian who taught a course on 
the war at New Mexico State University at Las Cruces, 
described his students as "tabula rasa" on the subject,24 
and he was echoed by fellow historians. George Herring, who 
taught at the University of Kentucky, told a reporter for 
the Wall Street Journal that he realized a new age had 
dawned when a student innocently asked what napalm was. 25 
Another historian tested his students on the first day of 
class and recalled most had never heard of My Lai, the Tet 
22 Washington Post, 19 April 1985, section I, p. 14. 
23 Adam Clymer, "Public Opinion and Vietnam: The Enduring 
Legacy," New York Times Magazine, 31 March 1985, 35. 
24 4 Ibid., o. 
25 Wall Street Journal, 24 January 1985, section I, p. 1. 
12 
Offensive or the Gulf of Tonkin. 26 
The students were not alone in their ignorance. At a 
press conference in February 1982, President Ronald Reagan 
said, incorrectly on all accounts, that before the 1954 
Geneva settlement Vietnam had been divided into North and 
South; Ho Chi Minh had avoided the elections which were to 
have reunified the nation in 1956; and John Kennedy had sent 
the first American combat troops to Vietnam. 27 Reagan was 
more than matched, however, by a young woman not long out of 
high school, training for Army airborne duty at Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina. When a reporter asked for her opinion of 
the Vietnam War, she said, "It was stupid." 
"Would you feel that way if we had won?" the reporter 
replied. 
"I thought we did win." 
"When did you find out we lost?" 
"Just now. I never studied it, you know. "28 
Being Able To Forget The War 
26 Ibid. 
27 Newsweek, "Lyndon B. Reagan on Vietnam," 3 March 1982, 
30. 
28 Clymer, 35. 
13 
In the years after 1975, Americans wished to forget the 
Vietnam War for understandable reasons. People of all 
political stripes found it an anxious, embarrassing memory. 
It was a difficult episode to grasp as well, for its history 
was long and gradual and seemed to lack a clear beginning, 
middle and end. According to one writer, "It ended as it 
began, imperceptibly. ,,29 Another writer described the war 
as having "a kind of nightmare geometry • • • • There was no 
organizing principle, no discernible narrative line--instead 
there was a web of stories .••• ,,30 Lance Morrow, who 
wrote widely on the war's legacy, said America lost the war 
"ambiguously," quoting Gillespie "Sonny" Montgomery, a 
conservative Congressman from Mississippi: "tWe didn't 
really lose it. They didn't overrun us or push us into the 
sea. We just fought the war in a strange way • . It's 
an issue that's past now. Americans always want to move on 
to other things.' ,,31 
29 A.D. Horne, ed., The Wounded Generation (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), xi. 
30 Kathyrn Marshall, In The Combat Zone (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1987), 14. 
31 Lance Morrow, "America After Vietnam," Horizons (July 
1977), 43-44. 
14 
The war was further muddied in memory by the 
ambivalence of those who still argued it. The left's 
ambivalence seemed to be greater, the right's rather muted 
but telling all the same. In Commentary, the influential 
conservative magazine, writer Robert Tucker defended his 
opposition to the war and then wavered. He called the 
conflict a "classic case of an imperial war," the work of 
men who wanted to preserve America's "political 
preponderance," but ended by worrying about the implications 
of abandoning South Vietnam. 32 His worries stemmed from an 
ambivalence that grew during the war, an attitude Tucker and 
others noted. Americans had wanted to end the war, but a 
hasty withdrawal or an admitted defeat were never acceptable 
courses. Henry Kissinger mentioned the same dual attitude 
in his memoirs: "Thousands of decent and patriotic Americans 
from every walk of life were moved to protest against an 
enterprise that had exacted such a human toll. At the same 
time, poll after poll showed the overwhelming majority of 
the American public unprepared to accept an outright, 
h . l' t' A . d f t ,,33 um1 1a 1ng mer1can e ea • One such poll in November 
1967 had shown 44 percent in favor of complete or gradual 
32 Robert Tucker, "Vietnam: The Final Reckoning," 
Commentary (May 1975), 28-29. 
33 Henry Kissinger, Years Of Upheaval (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1982), 84. 
15 
withdrawal, but 55 percent wanting a tougher, more effective 
policy.34 
Americans did not like losing period, and after seeing 
so many of their countrymen die in Vietnam were not about to 
give up the cause completely. In his personal account of 
the war, A Rumor Of War, former Marine Phillip Caputo got to 
the heart of the matter, saying, "There was so much human 
suffering ••• that I could not respond to it. It was 
numbing. I wanted to see it end. At the same time, a part 
of me did not want to see it end in a North Vietnamese 
victory. I kept thinking about Levy, about Sullivan, about 
all of the others, and something in me cried out against the 
waste of their lives. ,,35 Writing in 1977 , political 
scientists Sol Sanders and William Henderson said, "The 
American people are still weary of Vietnam, and most of 
us--even the doves--are at least a little touched by 
feelings of guilt. ,,36 
In the years to follow, a sort of left-wing repentance 
became a familiar refrain. Political writer Fred Barnes, 
34 Myra MacPherson, Long Time Passing (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday Books, 1984), 24. 
35 Phillip Caputo, A Rumor Of War (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1977), 342. 
36 Sol Sanders and William Henderson, "The Consequences 
of Vietnam," Orbis (Spring 1977), 74. 
16 
who said he voted for radical Dick Gregory in 1968 but then 
had a change of heart after North Vietnam won, took such 
journalistic colleagues as Walter Cronkite to task for not 
doing the same. 37 The editors of the New Republic, which in 
1975 had called the war evil, threw themselves at the mercy 
of a forgiving God when considering it ten years later. 
. • . we should be haunted by the way we deserted men 
and women who clung to us out of conviction or out of 
innocence, even men and women who clung to us out of 
avarice or just plain fear .. there was something 
unseemly in our haste to deny them that last measure of 
assistance that might have enabled them to establish 
some position of strength from which they could bargain 
with the enemy ..•. On what moral calculus were these 
decisions made? And, given what The know today, on what 
calculus are they to be defended? 
After 1975, the right wing's most persistent champions 
of the war were Richard Nixon and Norman Podhoretz, editor 
of Commentary and author of the book Why We Were In Vietnam. 
Nixon's defense of the war began in 1969, when he became 
Commander in Chief. In his memoirs he gave a cut and dried 
version: 
The congressional bombing cutoff, coupled with the 
limitation placed on the President by the War Powers Act 
of November 1973, set off a string of events that led to 
a Communist takeover in Cambodia and, on April 30, 1975, 
the North Vietnamese conquest of South Vietnam. . . 
Congress denied first to me, and then to President Ford, 
the means to enforce the Paris agreement at a time when 
the North Vietnamese were openly violating it. Even 
31 Fred Barnes, "My Change of Heart," New Republic, 29 
April 1985, 12. 
38 New Republic, 29 April 1985, 8-9. 
17 
more devastating and inexcusable, in 1974 Congress began 
cutting back on military aid for South Vietnam at a time 
when the Soviets were increasing aid to North 
Vietnam. • . • The war and peace in Indochina that 
America had won at such cost over 12 years of sacrifice 
and fighting were lost within a matter of months once 
Congress refused to fulfill our obligations. And it is 
Congress that m~st bear the responsibility for the 
tragic results. 
Nixon's argument was an American version of the 
German "stab-in-the-back" theory, which had blamed spineless 
politicians for losing a war, World War One, thought to have 
been won on the battlefield. As Norman Podhoretz pointed 
out, however, after the Tet Offensive swung public opinion 
against the war in 1968 neither the Johnson nor Nixon 
administrations offered further reasons for being in 
Vietnam. Instead, they talked of how best to leave. The 
effect, said Podhoretz, "was to concede the moral and 
political arguments to the antiwar forces--by now a 
coalition that included people who had led the country into 
Vietnam in the first place and were eager to atone by 
leading it out."40 Henry Kissinger confirmed what Podhoretz 
said, noting, "We did not question the desirability of 
disengagement."Cl It was a crucial point in the debate, for 
39 Richard M. Nixon, Memoirs (New York: Gosset and Dunlap, 
1978), 889. 
40 Norman Podhoretz, Why We Were In Vietnam (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1982), 10. 
Cl Kissinger, 83. 
18 
the right wing, which embraced the war as its own when Nixon 
became president, did not articulate reasons for sending 
American combat troops to Vietnam in the first place. 
Rather, the right settled for a moral argument best phrased 
by Podhoretz, who called the war "an act of imprudent 
idealism whose moral soundness has been so overwhelmingly 
vindicated by the hideous consequences of our defeat."42 
Possibly, such an argument rang as hollow to many 
Americans as the early left-wing argument that a Communist 
victory was not so terrible. According to Podhoretz, 
Americans who had seen nearly 58,000 of their countrymen die 
for "imprudent idealism" were to be consoled by its "moral 
soundness." Americans were probably somewhat consoled by 
the idea that the war was begun with good intentions. John 
Roche, an aide to Lyndon Johnson, said, "1 will argue to my 
dying day that this was the most idealistic war we have ever 
fought, fundamentally a war for an abstraction: the freedom 
of a bunch of Asians at the end of the world. "43 Roche's 
comment, however, underscored the probable weakness of the 
conservative line as pursued by Podhoretz and himself. To 
say the war was fought out of imprudent idealism or for an 
42 Podhoretz, 210. 
43 John Roche, "Vietnam Ten Years Later," National Review, 
3 May 1985, 44. 
19 
abstraction was to say, in essence, the war and its 
casualties were unnecessary. Thus, while the left 
recanted, the right tried to stay firm on slippery ground. 
Neither's versions were widely embraced. 
This lack of political consensus made the war easier 
for Americans to forget, but it would not seem to have fully 
explained their amnesia. For had not the war been a 
national trauma? When Americans thought of the war, scenes 
of pain and turmoil came to mind: the My Lai massacre, the 
Tet Offensive, the little girl in the famous photograph 
running down the road after her village was napalmed, the 
Kent State killings, the mayhem at the 1968 Democratic Party 
convention in Chicago, Americans tortured in enemy cells, 
veterans throwing away their purple hearts in front of the 
Pentagon. Television journalist Howard K. Smith spoke the 
conventional wisdom when he ranked the war as America's 
third greatest crisis, behind only the Civil War and the 
Great Depression. 44 So did Myra MacPherson, author of Long 
Time Passing, a social history of the war and its effects, 
when she said, "As much as we yearn to put it behind us, we 
cannot get over all the pain and divisions it caused. ,,45 
44 Jan Scruggs, To Heal A Nation (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1985), 1. 
45 MacPherson, 607. 
20 
The war had surely seemed traumatic and was remembered as 
such by most who made the effort, mainly in the mass media. 
A few observers, though, wondered if for most Americans 
the war was not a lasting trauma, but really just a scar. 
In Commentary, Charles Horner said, "The consequences of our 
defeat, being neither so vivid nor so apparent as an 
occupying army in the nation's capital, remind us that 
whatever we lost in Vietnam, others have lost more.,,46 
Gloria Emerson, author of Winners And Losers, one of the 
war's first social histories (1976), said, "The country was 
not particularly shattered by the war--so it is not 
surprising that a healing is occurring now. We are an 
inattentive and self-absorbed people. I suppose that 
inattentiveness is also a protection of sorts.,,47 Ward 
Just, who covered the war for the Washington Post and wrote 
one its early novels, Stringer, put the matter thus: The 
United States was "two nations where Vietnam is 
c~ncerned--those deeply touched by what happened there and 
those not affected. ,,48 
46 Charles Horner, "America Five Years After Defeat," 
Commentary (April 1980), 50. 
41 Morrow, 43. 
U Ibid., 43. 
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The strongest evidence to support this line of dissent 
was that the war had been largely forgotten. If it had been 
a trauma, how was that possible? One answer may have been 
that it was not truly a trauma for most Americans, or if it 
was, it was a trauma played out half way around the world, 
with reverberations in Washington, D.C., Cambridge and 
Berkley, and in small towns when service chaplains grimly 
rang the doorbell. For the 26.8 million young men who were 
eligible for the draft during the war, there was on the 
average a 10 percent chance of facing combat in Vietnam, 
only seven percent if one was from a family of middle or 
high income, 15 percent if one was poor. 49 Most who served 
in Vietnam did not see combat, instead playing a supporting 
role of some kind. While many young men found the very 
prospect of the draft traumatic, while some wrestled with 
their conscience, with the logistics of avoiding service or 
with club-wielding policemen at anti-war rallies, this was 
not the same sort of anguish as seeing a friend blown to 
pieces by a Viet Cong mortar or having oneself disfigured in 
similar fashion. Generally speaking, the real trauma would 
seem to have been experienced in Vietnam, where the war was, 
not in the United States. Again, those in the age group 
49 Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, "The Vietnam 
Generation," Horne, 6. 
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most likely to be affected by the war, those of draft age, 
faced only a 10 percent chance of combat. Many, especially 
college students of means, easily beat the odds. 
Many Americans either too young or too old for the 
draft were likely not permanently touched by the war. A 
young writer named David Bell said in 1985, "Despite hearing 
about the war constantly during my childhood, from 
television and student protests, the war had no real 
impact on me." He added that as a college student in 1980 
he noticed little opposition among his contemporaries to 
Jimmy Carter's plan for draft registration, saying the 
Vietnam War "was already as alien to us personally as World 
War Two or Korea." To verify his impressions Bell 
interviewed young men and women at the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial in Washington, where a 19-year-old told him, "I was 
really confused when my parents said we were at war. It 
didn't seem like that. You couldn't exactly walk down the 
streets and notice it."50 A national survey in 1985 
revealed that 44 percent of those polled said they did not 
remember discussing the war with their family or friends 
while it was being fought. Thirty-six percent said the war 
affected them "hardly at all" and 17 percent said "not in 
50 David Bell, "The Lost Generation Gap," New Republic, 
29 April 1985, 14. 
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the least."S1 
Much was made of the Vietnam War having been televised, 
in all its horror, into the living rooms of America. But a 
study of the televised war showed that much less than half 
the film footage was related to battle, and, the Tet 
Offensive aside, only six or seven percent showed heavy 
combat. John Mueller, one of the study's authors, noted 
that television existed during the Korean War and that 
studies made during World War Two indicated that realistic 
photographs did not change people's ideas of war. Said 
Mueller, "If you think that the war in Vietnam was a 
television war, and that people turned against the war 
because they saw it every night, it is equivalent to saying 
that the American people are so stupid that they don't know 
what war is. People know what wars are; they do not have to 
I · d t I .. ,,52 have them exp a1ne on e eV1S10n. If most Americans did 
not see the war first hand and if television did not 
transmit the trauma, what was the war's true effect over 
here? Perhaps it was captured by one soldier's anectdote. 
Martin Greenberg told of chatting with a young lady at a San 
Francisco nightclub the evening before departing for 
51 Washington Post, 15 April 1985, section I, p. 19. 
5Z Lawrence Lichty, Murray Fromson and John Mueller, "A 
Television War?" Vietnam As History, Peter Baestrup, ed. 
(New York: Wilson Books, 1983), 86-88. 
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Vietnam. When he informed her of his travel plans, she 
dented his romantic armor with a shrug. Said Greenberg, ItIt 
was as if I had said that I was going to a Giants game at 
Candlestick. 1t53 
Both the obvious and more subtle reasons for forgetting 
the war--its distastefullness, confusing narrative and 
minimal concrete effect on the American public--were an 
explanation that was still lacking somehow. Another 
question was begged. Even if the war was not the 
indelible trauma many believed, was it not still an 
important episode, one that people should have been 
compelled to remember? Americans were supposed to be 
infamously ahistorical, but they did remember events like 
the Civil War and World War Two, and besides, the Vietnam 
War was recent, controversial, colorful in its way. It was 
a sorry tale but good copy. Why, then, the political 
amnesia? 
The root of the answer may have been exposed by Joseph 
Lelyveld, a writer for the New York Times Magazine. In 
examining the American memory of the war, he said, It •.• 
when we talk about Vietnam we are seldom talking about the 
country of that name or the situation of the people who live 
53 Martin Greenberg and Augustus Norton, Touring Nam (New 
York: William Morrow, 1985), 9. 
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there. Usually we are talking about ourselves. Probably we 
always were."SC Other commentators noted the trend, the 
"self-absorption" Gloria Emerson had cited. Stanley Herman, 
a doctoral candidate at the University of Chicago Divinity 
School, said, " •.• our commentary on Vietnam has narrowed 
into a preoccupation with American experiences of the war," 
adding that Hollywood films such as The Deerhunter and 
Apocalypse Now, a growing number of war novels and the 
dedication of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington 
all served to focus attention on "what the war did to us." 
He said further, "This in turn has not extinguished the 
smoldering debates about the meaning of the war, debates 
that continue to ignore the large majority of victims--the 
Vietnamese who stayed in Vietnam. . . . Turned inward, we 
have forgotten that our national agony, however defined, was 
not the principal moral fact of the war.,,55 Peter Marin, 
another who explored the war's moral side, described the 
Vietnamese as "stickfigures in the American dream. ,,56 A 
survey in 1970, three years before America withdrew from 
54 Joseph Lelyveld, "Vietnam In Retrospect," New York 
Times Magazine, 31 March 1985, p. 30. 
55 Stewart Herman, "Vietnam: Widening Our Perspective," 
Christian Century, 1 May 1985, 442. 
56 Peter Marin, "Coming To Terms With Vietnam," Harper's 
(December 1980), 43. 
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Vietnam, showed there was no scholar in the United States 
who devoted most of his or her time to studying North 
Vietnam, no American university had a tenured professorship 
in Vietnamese studies and fewer than 30 college students in 
the entire nation studied the Vietnamese language. 51 
The feelings of many Americans toward their lost ally 
were expressed by one Alan "Doc" Cornett, an Army sergeant 
with 20 years of service who told a reporter in 1985, "You 
could lose all respect for the Vietnamese, till you fought 
beside them, touched them, lived with them." When he 
arrived in Vietnam, Cornett had joined his buddies in 
hurling cans of C-rations at Vietnamese civilians from a 
speeding truck. But he became fluent in the language and 
two of its dialects, befriended a South Vietnamese soldier 
with whom he worked as a Special Forces medic and eventually 
married the man's sister. Because he was one of the few who 
really knew the Vietnamese, Cornett was one of the few who 
thought of them first when recalling the war. "We deserted 
them, you know," he told the reporter. 58 
American veterans of the war routinely remembered 
playing with Vietnamese children or lending a hand to 
51 Fox Butterfield, "The New Vietnam Scholarship," New 
York Times Magazine, 13 February 1984, 30-31. 
58 Clymer, 42. 
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villagers. Thomas Pelleton, an intelligence specialist with 
the 101st Airborne, wrote home from Phu Bai about such 
experiences. "We played games with them, went for a walk to 
the beach, took pictures, in general just loved them up. 
They stole my watch, but it didn't really matter. 
Just as routinely, though, one found in the war's literature 
accounts of American atrocities, in which Vietnamese friend 
and foe alike were treated as animals. In his oral history 
'Nam, Mark Baker was told of random rapes, killings and 
tortures. 60 Lieutenant William Calley's book, His Own 
Story, was numbing in its boy-next-door description of a 
soldier's dehumanization. 51 In Rumor Of War, Phillip Caputo 
remembered being told that one of his men had been cutting 
off the ears of dead Viet Cong. Wrote Caputo, "An image of 
Hanson flashed in my mind: a quiet boy of about nineteen, 
tall and thin, with dark blond hair, he was so 
American-looking he could have posed for a Norman Rockwell 
in the old Saturday Evening Post. I tried to imagine him 
performing the act Loker had just described, but 
59 Bernard Edelman, ed., Dear America: Letters Home From 
Vietnam (New York: Norton, 1985), 49. 
60 Mark Baker, Nam (New York: Quill Press, 1982), 211-215. 
61 William Calley, His Own Story (New York: Viking Press, 
1971). 
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couldn't.,,6Z In his book Dispatches, journalist Michael 
Herr repeated a well-worn joke: "What you do is, you load 
all the Friendlies onto ships and take them out to the South 
China Sea. Then you bomb the country flat. Then you sink 
the ships. ,,63 
Since Americans knew little of Vietnam, since American 
soldiers felt little kinship with her people and since most 
in the United States remembered the war's effects on their 
country only, there was the strong suggestion that Vietnam 
in truth meant little to America. Here again semantics were 
important. The Vietnam War had been important because 
Americans were fighting it; American lives and prestige were 
on the line. Once the war was over, however, its political 
history was easily forgotten, at the behest of several 
presidents, no less. Casualties, social turmoil and 
Communist re-education camps aside, the war's strategic 
effects were unclear. Cambodia and Laos were both overrun 
by Communists, but Thailand and other nations in the region 
did not fall like so many dominoes. In 1979, Vietnam fought 
a short border war with its recent wartime ally, China. By 
the early 1980s there were signs of tension between Vietnam 
6Z Caputo, 125. 
63 Michael Herr, Dispatches (New York: Alfred Knopf, 
1977), 59. 
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and the Soviet Union, the former seeming to resent its 
principal ally's instrusiveness. 
The Vietnam War had been important, but for reasons of 
culture, geography and strategy, Vietnam itself may not have 
been. William Sullivan, a career diplomat and former 
Ambassador to Laos, spoke of the war in retrospect as an 
inevitable result of the Cold War . 
• . we were damned lucky it happened in a place that 
didn't matter all that much, like Indochina. Had we 
taken a stand in a place like Hungary, it could have 
blown up the world, including the United States. 
Fifty-eight thousand lives is too many to pay for a 
lesson, but it's probably smaller than we might have 
paid had we gone into Czechoslovakia in '68, or done 
something else that would have led to a direct 
confrontation with the Soviets or the Chinese. 64 
Such a clash, if not an Armageddon, would surely have 
been remembered in political detail. The Vietnam War was 
not. The failure to achieve its purpose--an independent, 
non-Communist South Vietnam--was mourned but not met with 
alarm. It is possible, perhaps likely, that the war's 
history was forgotten because few were pressed to remember. 
64 Kim Willenson, ed., The Bad War (New York: The New 
American Library, 1987), 385. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE VETERANS REMEMBER 
Meaninglessness 
In his novel Fragments, Vietnam veteran Jack Fuller 
described a soldier's uncomfortable homecoming. At 
breakfast with his mother and father the morning after 
returning from the war, the soldier got news that was 
supposed to be sensitive. 
"John Russell was over in Vietnam," said my mother. 
"Do you remember him?" 
"The name," I said. "Sure. John Russell. He was 
a year or two behind me, I think." 
"He was killed there," my mother said softly. 
"Fuckit," I said. 
Said Fuller's soldier as the narrative continued, "When I 
looked up and saw their faces, I realized what I had said, 
not only the word but the way it sounded, and I was sorry. "I 
Fuller's fictional scene dramatized the gap between the 
minority of Americans who had seen the war and the majority 
who had not, the "two countries" Ward Just had noted. The 
same sort of gap had been mentioned by writers of previous 
modern wars. Poet Karl Shapiro, who fought in the Second 
World War, spoke of "the majority, untouched by steel or 
1 Jack Fuller, Fragments (New York: William Murrow, 1984), 
165-167. 
30 
31 
psychoneurosis. "2 Writing of the First World War, e.e. 
cummings described those who "don't and never never will 
know, they don't want to, no • ,,3 In Dispatches, . . . 
Michael Herr recalled a Marine in Hue who grabbed him 
forcibly as the writer was leaving the city, and implored 
him to "tell it," to describe the war truthfully for the 
uninitiated. Herr said other soldiers did the same "with an 
emotion whose intensity would shock you ••• because they 
really did have the feeling that it wasn't being told for 
them, that they were going through all of this and that 
somehow no one back in the World knew about it."( 
Herr and fellow journalists did tell about the war in 
critically acclaimed books, but much of its literature came 
from the soldiers themselves. Wrote George Herring, "One 
must go back to World War One to find a body of war 
literature as personal and introspective as that produced by 
the Vietnam War.,,5 A number of Vietnam veterans saw the 
parallel. Poet R.L. Barth wrote this: 
You watch with me: Owen, Blunden, Sassoon. 
1 Thomas J. Walsh, American War Literature (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1980), 182. 
3 Ibid., 272. 
( Herr, 206-207. 
5 George Herring, "Vietnam Remembered," Journal of 
American History (June 1986), 152. 
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Through sentry duty, everything you meant 
Thickens to fear of nights without a moon. 
War's war. We are, my friends, no different. 6 
In his surrealistic Vietnam War novel Going After 
Cacciato, veteran Tim O'Brien began with a quote from 
Siegfried Sassoon: "Soldiers are dreamers."? Phillip Caputo 
began the epilogue to A Rumor Of War by quoting Sassoon 
also. 8 When asked at a writer's conference why the 
literature of the two wars seemed so similar, O'Brien 
replied, "An absence of clear purpose is the easiest 
answer. "9 
Such an absence of purpose or meaning has helped define 
modern war literature in general. It is well known as a 
theme in First World War books such as All Quiet On The 
Western Front and A Farewell To Arms, but it appears in 
earlier and later works, too: War And Peace, The Red Badge 
Of Courage and The Downfall by Emile Zola in the nineteenth 
6 John Topham, ed., Vietnam Literature Anthology: A 
Balanced Perspective (Philadelphia: American Poetry and 
Literature Press, 1985), 43. 
? Tim O'Brien, Going After Cacciato (New York: Delacorte 
Press, 1978). 
8 Caputo, 338. 
9 Freedman, 55. 
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century10, and The Naked And The Dead, Catch 22 and the 
Korean War film MASH in the twentieth. 
Samuel Freedman, a journalist who studied Vietnam War 
literature, said of its authors, "Their art is a search for 
that final, missing piece,"11 something to illuminate an 
unclear experience. According to W. D. Ehrhart, one of the 
more well-known Vietnam veteran poets, "For anyone who's 
been through an extremely traumatic experience, there's a 
driving need to explore it, to understand it. There is a 
turmoil inside. Those of us who could, articulated it with 
writing, painting, whatever."a John Ketwig, another 
veteran and author of And A Hard Rain Fell, wrote, "I only 
know that I'm searching for something, I have to find it, 
and I don't even know what it is.,,13 In Fragments, Jack 
Fuller described the search as such: 
Fragments • • • • You tried in vain to make 
connections. You yearned for explanations, 
exculpations. You remembered the details, the moments 
of horror. But you remembered the closeness, too, your 
pure mortal reliance on others. And no matter how you 
10 Sophus Keith Winter, The Realistic War Novel (Seattle: 
University of Washington Bookstore, 1930), 8. 
11 Freedman, 51. 
12 Ibid. 
13 John Ketwig, And A Hard Rain Fell (New York: MacMillan, 
1985), 294. 
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put the fragments together, they did not make a whole. 14 
Complicating the search for some veterans who wrote was 
the common attitude that the Vietnam War, or any war, was 
meaningless. Men who had seen combat sometimes had no 
patience with abstract political explanations. Said Phillip 
Caputo, "I was finished with governments and their abstract 
causes, and I would never again allow myself to fall under 
the charms and spells of political witch doctors like John 
F. Kennedy."15 Some writers had trouble finding any 
explanation other than that the war was pure madness. In 
his novel Meditations In Green, veteran Stephen Wright 
described a cut-and-paste magazine collage on a soldier's 
wall in Vietnam, a creation meant to communicate the idea of 
insanity: 
There would be much to ponder: presidents and 
penises, officers and orifices, history as an 
illustrated stroke book, from the ancient mamasan in 
conical hat and black latex to last year's Playmate of 
the Year from whose glossy pink ass a stick of 
five-hundred-pound bombs dropped onto a football field 
mined with pizzas where one team marked AFL rushed 
another team marked NLF for possession of the oversized 
head of Mickey Mouse decapitated by the blades of a 
Cobra helicopter streaming rockets into the U.S. C~itol 
dome that was a beanie on the head of Ho Chi Minh. 
14 Fuller, 153. 
15 Caputo, 332. 
16 Stephen Wright, Meditations In Green (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1983), 121. 
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The jungle warfare of Vietnam seemed to further obscure 
meaning. Phillip Caputo wrote, "Because of the sporadic, 
confused nature of the fighting, it is impossible to give an 
orderly account of what we did. With one or two exceptions, 
I have only disjointed recollections of this period, the 
spring of 1965. The incidents I do remember, I remember 
vividly; but I can come up with no connecting threads to tie 
events neatly together."1! In Going After Cacciato, Tim 
O'Brien produced this much-quoted passage: 
They did not even know the simple things: A sense 
of victory, or satisfaction, or necessary sacrifice. 
They did not know the feeling of taking a place and 
keeping it, securing a village and then raising the flag 
and calling it victory. No sense of order or momentum. 
No front, no rear, no trenches laid out in neat 
parallels. No Patton rushing for the Rhine, no 
beachheads to storm and win and hold for the duration. 
They did not have targets. They did not have a cause. 
They did not know if it was a war of ideology or 
economics or hegemony or spite. On a given day, they 
did not know whether they were in Quang Ngai, or how 
being there might influence larger outcomes. They did 
not know the names of most villages. They did not know 
which villages were critical. They did not know 
strategies. They did not know the terms of tThe war, its 
architecture, the rules of fair play • •• " 
Jan Barry, a veteran and poet, described in A Nun In 
Ninh Hoa how strange and exotic Vietnam seemed to Americans. 
The Buddhist nun in the poem self-immolated in protest 
against the South Vietnamese government, an act Barry said 
17 Caputo, 96. 
18 O'Brien, 128. 
was "quite a sight for a boy from Tennessee " The 
poem's last line is, "Jeesus! How'd we get in this crazy 
place? "19 John Del Vecchio, author of the novel The 
Thirteenth Valley, called Vietnam a place "where stars are 
dim and do not twinkle. "20 
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The theme of senselessness was at the heart of the 1979 
film Apocalypse Now, one of Hollywood's splashier attempts 
at capturing the Vietnam War. Marlon Brando played the role 
of a Green Beret colonel driven crazy by the war, living in 
the jungle among Montagnard tribesmen who believed him to be 
a god. As a special American unit works its way up the 
Mekong River to dispense with the renegade officer, scenes 
of madness unfold, one of the most memorable showing 
soldiers surfing in the midst of a helicopter raid on a Viet 
Cong inlet. The war was depicted in a like manner on stage. 
In playwright and veteran David Rabe's war trilogy, 
appearing from 1969 to 1977, mindless destruction was the 
lietmotif. In Sticks And Bones, a blind veteran slit his 
wrists, and both Streamers and The Basic Training Of Pavlo 
Hummel ended with soldiers murdering comrades. 21 
19 W.D. Ehrhart, ed., Carrying The Darkness: Vietnam War 
Poetry (New York: Avon Books, 1985), 27. 
20 John Del Vecchio, The Thirteenth Valley (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1982), 108. 
21 Freedman, 53. 
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Michael Herr was perhaps the most vivid in showing the 
war as madness. Employing an unusual and compelling style, 
Herr wrote parts of his true account Dispatches while 
undergoing psychotherapy. In the New York Times Review Of 
Books, critic Roger Sale said, "Herr at his best hurls one 
into his experience, insists an uninitiated reader be 
comforted with no politics, no certain morality, no clear 
outline of history."22 Herr's style was an extension of a 
belief he stated in Dispatches: "Conventional journalism 
could no more reveal this war than conventional firepower 
could win it, all it could do was take the most profound 
event of the American decade and turn it into a 
communications pudding, taking its most obvious, undeniable 
history and making it into a secret history."23 The 
"obvious, undeniable" history was the war's immediate 
effects of death and destruction and dehumanization. The 
secret history, in Herr's view, would have been politics and 
strategic rationale. Herr elaborated on this idea toward 
the end of his book: "It seemed now that everybody knew 
someone who had been in Vietnam and didn't want to talk 
about it. Maybe they just didn't know how. People I'd meet 
22 John Hellman, American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 165. 
23 Herr, 218. 
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would take it for granted that I was articulate, ask me if I 
minded, but usually the questions were political, square, 
innocent, they already knew what they wanted to hear, I'd 
practically forgotten the language."Z4 
Herr was revealing an essential point in modern 
writing, that language could not convey the ghastliness, 
surrealism and absurdity of war. This view was a rebellion 
against traditional history, arguing that a graphic, 
tangible and human portrayal was much truer than political 
abstractions. Writers who took this view wanted no tidy 
versions of an untidy affair. However, Michael Herr and 
others wondered if even the bluntest, most untraditional 
style could make the untouched masses comprehend war. Herr 
noted that when looking at war pictures in Life magazine as 
a child, "something wasn't clear at all, something repressed 
that monitored the images and withheld their essential 
information. • I didn't have a language for it 
then. "Z5 Veteran Jack Strahan addressed the same idea 
in his poem Dialogues With A Reporter: 
How can you comprehend, 
among your short and easy questions, 
the meaning of this word, fear, 
24 Ibid., 251. 
Z5 Ibid., 18. 
or the lack of feelings which start 
somewhere in your mind and travel 
slowly toward your gut where 
helplessness is not a word, 
but a knowledge of playing out slowly, 
an idiocy of men dying openly, 
who did not wonder how or why, 
or if someone like yourself 
would be along later asking these 
questions in your embarrassed voice?"26 
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W.D. Ehrhart wrote a similar poem, Imagine, in which he 
described his questioners trying to imagine war: 
They listened, and they strained 
to visualize the words: 
newsreels and photographs, books 
and Wilfred Owen tumbled 
through their minds. 
Pulses quickened. 
They didn't notice, as he talked, 
his eyes, as he talked, 
his eyes beginning to focus 
through the wall, at nothing, 
or at something inside. 
26 Topham, 29. 
When he finished speaking, 
someone asked him: 
had he ever killed?27 
Perhaps the most famous passage in war literature to 
argue against abstractions was Ernest Hemingway's in A 
Farewell To Arms. His protagonist Frederick Henry said, 
"Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage or hallow 
become obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the 
numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of 
regiments and the dates.,,28 Much of the Vietnam War's 
literature was mundane in its concrete detail. In Going 
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After Cacciato, Tim O'Brien wrote, "Over the next week they 
destroyed twelve tunnels. They killed a water buffalo. 
They burned rice and shot chickens and scattered jugs of 
grain. They trampled paddies. Tore up fences. Dumped dirt 
into wells, diverted ditches, provoked madness. ,,29 One of 
the novel's chapters bore the simple title How Bernie Lynn 
Died After Frenchie Tucker. 30 Like an extended tour of 
combat, the effect was numbing. 
27 Timothy J. Lomperis, ed., Reading The Wind (Durham, 
N.C.: The Asia Society,Duke University, 1987), 29. 
28 Frank McConnell, "A Name For Loss," Commonweal, 9 
August 1985, 441. 
29 O'Brien, 105. 
30 Ibid ., 66. 
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Jack Fuller pointed to a soldier's phrase that appears 
repeatedly in the war's literature: "It don't mean nothing." 
Wrote Fuller, "It was one of those things you said to one 
another for comfort, one of those things you really wanted 
to believe. A guy in another unit got greased. Don't mean 
nothin'. A round pierced your canteen and at first you 
weren't sure whether the dark stain spreading across your 
fatigues was water or blood. Don't mean nothin'. You 
survived, didn't you? Don't mean nothin' at all.,,31 
Meaning 
While the theme of meaninglessness haunted 
Vietnam War writers, most persisted in their search for 
meaning of a kind. They were compelled to believe that such 
a traumatic experience as war offered something in the way 
of enlightenment. Robert Jay Lifton, a psychologist who 
studied veterans and their problems, recalled listening to a 
triple amputee testify before a U.S. Senate subcommittee 
about the difficulties of getting proper medical treatment. 
The veteran spoke also of another problem--his doubts that 
31 Fuller, 14. 
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his sacrifice had meant anything. He later told Lifton he 
wanted to run for political office in his native deep South. 
When Lifton asked if a dissident such as himself were 
electable in that region, the veteran replied, "I'm no 
dissident! I've got to believe there was some value in that 
war.,,3Z Addressing the peace movement, a soldier who wrote 
his hometown newspaper from Vietnam uttered a similar 
sentiment: "Don't shout and preach your nothingness to 
me. ,,33 
Usually, as George Herring had noted in comparing the 
literature of the Vietnam War and World War One, veterans 
who wrote found a sort of personal, introspective meaning. 
The writers were aware of this and made no excuses. In his 
prologue to A Rumor Of War, Phillip Caputo wrote, "This book 
does not pretend to be history. It has nothing to do with 
politics, power, strategy, influence, national interests, or 
foreign policy •••• In a general sense, it is simply a 
story about war, about the things men do in war and the 
things war does to them."H In his personal account Once A 
Warrior King, former Army officer David Donovan said much 
3Z Robert Jay Lifton, "The Postwar War, II Journal of Social 
Issues, vol. 31, no. 4 (1975), 188-189. 
33 Edelman, 227. 
34 Caputo, xi. 
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the same: "I and ••. other Americans lived there alone and 
fought our own little war. This book portrays my memory of 
that experience • • • • It eschews the finer topics of 
international politics, military strategy, global economics, 
and who did what to whom first. These subjects are well 
worn and only lead to endless debate and disagreement, 
achieving nothing. "35 Mark Baker, in the preface to 'Nam, 
said, "This book is not the Truth about Vietnam. Everyone 
holds a piece of that puzzle. "36 
In response to a journalist's question, Tim O'Brien 
explored the matter of personal versus political 
remembrance. "When you think about novels about the war," 
he said, "they're rarely political. Because the issues you 
confront are personal, not political. Staying alive, 
burning a village, watching the bombs fall. The primary 
things one cares about in battle aren't the political 
issues. It's being scared, being brave. Those are the 
things that go back to Homer. Those are the ancient 
things. "31 0' Brien was among the most profound of the 
veterans who searched for meaning, quoting Plato and 
35 David Donovan, Once A Warrior King (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1985), viii. 
36 Baker, 16. 
37 Freedman, 55. 
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Socrates in his ruminations. In both the fictional Going 
After Cacciato and the nonfictional If I Die In A Combat 
Zone, O'Brien found meaning in personal courage. The latter 
contained a long, philosophical passage that analyzed the 
quality: 
Courage is more than the charge. More than dying 
or suffering the loss of a love in silence or being 
gallant. It is temperament and, more, wisdom •••• It 
is more likely that men act cowardly and, at other 
times, act with courage, each in different measure, each 
with varying consistency. The men who do well on the 
average, perhaps with one moment of glory, those men are 
brave ..•• The bullets stop •••• You tentatively 
peek up, wondering if it is the end •••• The fright 
dies the same way novocaine wears off in the dentist's 
chair. You promise, almost moving your lips, to do 
better next time; that by itself is a kind of courage. 38 
In Going After Cacciato, the protagonist Paul Berlin 
reflected thus: 
Yes, the issue was courage. It always had been, 
even as a kid. Things scared him. He couldn't help 
it.. The real issue was the power of will to 
defeat fear .••• Somehow working his way into that 
secret chamber of the human heart, where, in tangles, 
lay the circuitry for all that was possible, the full 
range of what a man might be •••• ~here was a Silver 
Star twinkling somewhere inside him. 
In The Thirteenth Valley, John Del Vecchio's soldiers 
sought meaning in the war diversely, even hazarding 
political explanations, though more typical was the comment, 
38 Tim O'Brien, If I Die in a Combat Zone (New York: Dell 
Publishing, 1979), 141. 
39 O'Brien, Cacciato, 81. 
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"Our ultimate goal ..• is ta remain alive. ,,40 Del Vecchio 
frequently used a saltier version of the phrase Jack Fuller 
used in Fragments: "Fuck it. Don't mean nothin'." Del 
Vecchio called it the "mantra of the infantry. ,,41 At his 
novel's end, though, the phrase and its message were 
challenged. When a soldier learned from his new company 
commander that the former commander and several colleagues 
presumed to be dead are considered missing in action, the 
soldier cynically and automatically said, "Fuck it. Don't 
mean • " Whereupon the new commander cut him off with, . . . 
"Don't say it, soldier.,,42 Del Vecchio did not offer an 
explanation of the war, but he did suggest meaning was not 
completely absent. 
The film The Deerhunter seemed to suggest the same upon 
its release in 1978. The story focused on three steelworker 
friends from western Pennsylvania who enthusiastically went 
to Vietnam together. One was disabled, one killed himself 
playing Russian roulette, one was rendered emotionally 
withdrawn. Though the film was stark in its depiction of 
war, it ended on a faintly hopeful note. As the two 
survivors and friends gathered to eat after burying the dead 
40 Del Vecchio, 365. 
41 Ibid., 476. 
42 Ibid., 517. 
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man, one absentmindedly began humming God Bless America, and 
the others slowly followed with words, sung in haunting 
fashion. It was not a rousing finish, but it was enough to 
imply the three soldiers had not suffered meaninglessly. 
Released just three years after Saigon fell, The Deerhunter 
did not loudly proclaim duty and patriotism as the Vietnam 
War's meaning, or the meaning of war in general. But it may 
have suggested as much in a qualified way. 
Personalizing The War 
By looking inward for meaning, those who wrote about 
the Vietnam War naturally personalized their accounts. 
Instead of dwelling on causes or ideology, they dwelled on 
people, individuals. This tendency was explained by Phillip 
Caputo in A Rumor Of War, in a passage about a chaplain who 
was concerned about the casualty rate. Said Caputo to the 
chaplain, It ••• twelve KIAs [killed in action] in two 
months isn't bad." 
The chaplain answered emotionally, "That's twelve 
wrecked homes. Twelve wrecked homes, lieutenant ••• 
Twelve KIAs is pretty bad for the families of those dead 
marines. "43 
After the exchange Caputo considered the chaplain's 
words: "Twelve wrecked homes. I thought about Sullivan's 
young widow in Pennsylvania, and a chill passed through 
me. "44 
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At the beginning of his book Caputo gave his own 
personal history, telling how he was from suburban 
Westchester, Illinois, outside of Chicago, a place, he 
wrote, that had "everything a suburb is supposed to have: 
sleek, new schools smelling of fresh plaster and floor wax; 
supermarkets full of Wonder Bread and Bird's Eye frozen 
peas .•• ,,45 Veteran Michael Anania gave a similar 
description of middle America in his poem A Second-Hand 
Elegy, about young men in their last idyll before going to 
Vietnam: 
•.• riding through Dayton on a Saturday night 
making the rounds, block by block, 
43 Caputo, 178. 
H Ibid., 180. 
45 Ibid., 4. 
the car radio marking time--
Downtown Downtown--
the evening blush of neon blooming 
into damp city air, the blue 
clarity of mercury-lamp arcades; 
four of them slouched in a Chevrolet 
exhaust the evening, waiting for something to 
happen. 46 
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Ron Kovic described his own prewar idyll in his 
nonfictional Born On The Fourth Of July, in which he 
lovingly spoke of his childhood in the suburbs of Dwight 
Eisenhower's and John Kennedy's America. He wrote of 
idolizing Mickey Mantle and the New York Yankees, watching 
Howdy Doody, Roy Rogers and Elvis Presley on television, 
firmly embracing his Catholic faith, seeing The Sands Of Iwo 
Jima and other John Wayne films, playing soldier with 
plastic guns and hand grenades, feeling shock and wounded 
pride when the Russians launched Sputnik. Said Kovic, "When 
the Fourth of July came, there were fireworks going off all 
over the neighborhood. It was the most exciting time of the 
year for me next to Christmas. Being born on the same day 
as my country I thought was really great. I was so 
46 Ehrhart, 1. 
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proud. ,,47 
A book that personalized the war much as any was 
Friendly Fire, by C.D.B. Bryan. Friendly Fire was the true 
story of Gene and Peg Mullen, who ran a family farm near La 
Porte City, Iowa, and whose son Michael was accidentally 
killed by South Vietnamese artillery fire. Beyond 
describing Michael in all his shades, Bryan does the same 
for his parents to an even greater extent, telling how they 
raised their son, counseled him on going to Vietnam, reacted 
to the news of his death, conducted their own inquiry into 
the matter to discover the whole truth and later joined the 
antiwar movement. Generally speaking, Bryan told the tale 
of just one of Phillip Caputo's "wrecked homes" in studious 
detail. He delved into the family's history as far back as 
Gene Mullen's grandfather, saying a .photograph shows not "a 
maudlin old man hugging his grandchildren; it is a 
photograph of a pioneer. ,,48 There was a passage about 
Gene's father, Oscar, revealing how he wanted to be a 
baseball player, not a farmer, and how he left the farm to 
become the groundskeeper for the Waterloo, Iowa, minor 
47 Ron Kovic, Born on the Fourth of July (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1976), 36-45. 
48 C.D.B. Bryan, Friendly Fire (New York: Putnam, 1976), 
31. 
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league team. 49 Gene Mullens was his father's seriousminded 
opposite, a quiet, sincere man who resuscitated the farm and 
sent Michael, his oldest son, to college so he could apply 
business theory to the operation when it someday became his. 
Michael had the same love for the land that his 
father did. When Gene walks his fields, he will 
sometimes pause and wonder whether his 
great-grandfather might have walked that same section, 
or his grandfather ••.• it was that sense of 
continuity which was, perhaps, the strongest link 
between Gene, as father, and Michael, his son. Gene 
never felt Michael was to fall heir to acres only. He 
was to inherit all those generations of Mullins and 
Dobshires who would walk beside him each time he turned 
the soil .... Mifihael was always the one to have 
received the farm. 
In writing of Michael Mullen's status and 
responsibility within his family, Bryan attempted to show 
the true human impact of a single death. There were 
countless other personalizations in the war's literature. 
In Winners And Losers, Gloria Emerson examined numerous 
people who were somehow touched by the war, for example, a 
veteran who went by the name Weasel and lived in a 
junkyard. 51 Poet Bryan Alec Floyd wrote a series of poems 
named after fallen comrades: Private Ian Godwin, Sergeant 
Brandon Just, Corporal Charles Chungtu, Lance Corporal 
49 Ibid., 32-33. 
50 Ibid., 35. 
51 Gloria Emerson, Winners and Losers (New York: Random 
House, 1976), 89. 
Purdue Grace, Private Jack Smith, Captain James Leson, 
Corporal Kevin Spina, Private First Class Brooks 
Morgenstein. 52 Writer Heather Brandon produced a book 
entitled Casualties which focused on familes who, like the 
51 
Mullens of Friendly Fire, lost sons and brothers in the war. 
In her introduction, Brandon wrote, "What America doesn't 
see are the surviving families that now dread the unspoken 
words and melancholy that surround their holidays. What 
America doesn't see are the 57,939 shrines of pictures and 
medals, in houses and apartments from Maine to Hawaii, 
Alaska to Puerto Rico, Chicago to New Orleans •••• What 
America doesn't see are the 115,878 mothers and fathers, the 
231,756 grandparents, the uncounted brothers, sisters, 
daughters, sons, friends and lovers ••. Lynda Van 
Devanter, a nurse in Vietnam, wrote A Piece Of My Heart, a 
book about nurses in the war. "I was amazed that fifteen 
thousand women had been in Vietnam," she wrote, "and yet I 
had heard nothing about them in the "aftermath of the war."54 
Black journalist Wallace Terry wrote an oral history, 
52 Ehrhart, 108-118. 
53 Heather Brandon, Casualties (New York: St. Martin's 
Press, 1984), xviii-xix. 
54 Lynda Van Devanter, A Piece of My Heart (New York: 
Beaufort Books, 1983), 2. 
52 
Bloods, about black soldiers during and after the war. 55 
In the main, the few Americans who truly remembered the 
Vietnam War, most of them veterans, did so personally, 
subjectively, shunning political abstractions. In most of 
these accounts neither the Vietnamese nor the war's history 
was forgotten. Vietnamese soldiers and villagers were fully 
dimensional characters in both the fiction and nonfiction. 
In Going After Cacciato there was even a North Vietnamese 
draft resister, whose words had a familiar ring: "A whole 
future destroyed •••. Ruined by a war I never cared about, 
never even thought about."56 Nearly all the writings, 
including the most personalized, were informed by politics 
and history to some degree. But the literature tended to 
look inward, for after all, the writers were telling their 
own stories. They concentrated on what the war did to 
themselves and their comrades, on how Americans were 
affected. By and large this was honest self-reflection, not 
xenophobic self-absorption. The veterans who put pen to 
paper were searching for meaning in a cause the American 
public had laid aside after 1975, or perhaps after 1973. 
55 Wallace Terry, Bloods (New York: Random House, 1984). 
56 O'Brien, Cacciato, 96. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE PUBLIC REMEMBERS THE VETERANS 
From Scapegoats To Romantic Heroes 
The frosty, sometimes harsh reception of veterans 
returning from Vietnam had by the late 1970s become a 
well-known tale. Most veterans quietly re-entered society, 
their service neither honored nor openly scorned, but some 
remembered moments of contempt or abuse. As one writer 
said, they had been "tarred with the brush of My Lai," 
collectively blamed for atrocities and other dark aspects of 
the war, or simply for losing it. 1 Ron Kovic, who was 
disabled in the war, remembered being neglected in a 
Veterans Administration hospital. 
"I'm a Vietnam veteran," he told an aide. "I 
fought in Vietnam and I've got a right to be treated 
decently. 
"Vietnam," the aide said loudly. "Vietnam don't 
mean nothin' to me or any of these other people. You 
can take your Vietnam and shove it up your ass.,,2 
Vietnam veterans were not completely forgotten in the 
1 Tracy Kidder, "Soldiers of Misfortune," Atlantic 
Monthly (March 1978), 43. 
2 Kovic, 116. 
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early and mid-1970s. Occasionally a story would appear in 
the media about the plight of veterans, and as early as 1971 
a writer named Murray Polner wrote a book entitled No 
Victory Parades, a study of nine veterans from low and 
middle class backgrounds. 3 
The same year, folk singer John Prine recorded two 
songs sympathetic to veterans. Sam Stone was the story of 
a veteran who could not adjust to civilian life and 
eventually overdosed on heroin. 4 In Take The Star Out Of 
The Window, Prine sang this: 
Hello California, hello Dad and Mom 
Ship ahoy, your baby boy is home from Vietnam 
Don't you ask me any questions 
about the medals on my chest 
Take the star out of the window, 
let my conscience take a rest."5 
According to several studies, the majority of Vietnam 
veterans fared reasonably well upon returning home, in 
contrast to their image as violent, drug-ridden outcasts. 
3 John Newman, ed., Vietnam War Literature: An Annotated 
Bibliography (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarcrow Press, 1982), 75. 
4 John Prine, Sam Stone, Atlantic Publishing Company, 
1971. 
5 John Prine, Take The Star Out Of The Window, Atlantic 
Publishing Company, 1971. 
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Journalist Tracy Kidder cited a Veterans Administration 
study that showed only one veteran in five having had 
serious problems with marriage, employment, drugs or the 
law. 6 A study in 1985 by the Washington Post and ABC News 
showed that more than half of all veterans had gone back to 
school after leaving the service; a veteran was more likely 
to have attended college than most his age. Only seven 
percent were unemployed, roughly the national average. 
Seventy-five percent made over $20,000 a year in salary and 
seventy-eight percent owned homes. Most were married and 
had children. When asked if they had benefitted from their 
service in Vietnam, 56 percent said yes, 29 percent no. 
Combat veterans, however, had met with a harder time. 
Forty-one percent had been divorced, 44 percent claimed to 
have suffered a drinking problem. 7 
The larger problem for Vietnam veterans, it seemed, was 
not so much social status as it was a feeling of not being 
recognized for doing their duty and fighting in an unpopular 
war. A veteran who referred to himself as "more 
conservative than liberal" told a journalist, "Understand 
me, man, I went in as GI Joe, hot to save America from the 
Communists. I spent 11 months in 'Nam and got the Bronze 
6 Kidder, 44. 
7 Washington Post, 14 April, 1985, section I, p. 11. 
Star. Now I'm back and I find I've been had. I've got no 
job and I'm nobody's hero. Sure I'm bitter. Shouldn't I 
be?"S Another veteran told his psychiatrist, "They think 
56 
you'r,e crazy or a fool for going in the first place. Look, 
we all know what the outcome of all that fighting was. . . . 
I thought when I went it was for the country. But it was 
for nothing and all those guys got killed and shot to pieces 
and there's no monuments. Nobody remembers or says anything 
about them." 9 
Still another veteran said, "If we weren't failures, 
why aren't there any monuments? Can you name any of the 
Marines who, in another war, would have been heroes? Do you 
remember any celebrations when we got back? How come I feel 
like I did something wrong, like holding up a bank, when 
someone asks about my shrapnel wound? How come I can't 
tell anyone I am proud to have fought for my country without 
wondering what they will think of me?"lO 
In one of the most anthologized Vietnam War poems, 
Relative Thing, W.D Ehrhart addressed the matter bitterly: 
We are the ones you sent to fight a war 
8 EIdson McGhee, "Home From Vietnam--The Plight Of A 
Vietnam Veteran," Crisis (June 1976), 220. 
9 Jeffrey A. Jay, "In Pursuit Of Scapegoats," Harper's 
(July 1978), 15. 
10 Ibid., 18. 
You didn't know a thing about •••• 
We have seen Democracy on Zippo raids 
Burning hooches to the ground, 
Driving eager Amtraks through a farmer's fields. 
We are the ones who have to live 
With the memory that we were the instruments 
Of your pigeon-breasted fantasies •••• 
Those of us that lived 
Have tried to tell you what went wrong. 
Now you think you do not have to listen. 
Just because we will not fit 
Into the uniforms of photographs 
Of you at twenty-one 
Does not mean you can disown us. 
We are your sons, America, 
And you cannot change that. 
When you awake, 
We will still be here. 11 
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In late 1978 and early 1979 the nation began to 
recognize and honor the Vietnam veteran. While a greater 
number of media stories on veterans may have then shown that 
the recognition was inevitable, several developments 
hastened the process. In April 1979 The Deerhunter won a 
11 Edelman, 231-233. 
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number of Academy awards, including Best Picture. Its chief 
competition was seen to be another Vietnam War film, Coming 
Home, which starred former antiwar activist Jane Fonda as 
the wife of a gung-ho Marine officer, who fell in love with 
an embittered veteran confined to a wheelchair. 
Simplistically, Coming Home was seen to be critical of the 
war and those warriors who believed in it, The Deerhunter 
less so, or perhaps even laudatory. As fate would have it, 
the presenter of the Best Picture award was John Wayne, 
Fonda's opposite number in the Hollywood war debate and star 
of the 1968 film The Green Berets, a positive depiction of 
America in Vietnam. Dying of cancer, Wayne was spared one 
last agony when Fonda's film did not win. Afterwards, Fonda 
called The Deerhunter "racist" in its portrayal of the 
Vietnamese, and a debate ensued among intellectuals and 
movie critics. Gloria Emerson said the film's director, 
Michael Cimino, had "cheapened and degraded and diminished 
the war as no one else has." Fellow war correspondent and 
author Ward Just called it "a slick and disgraceful 
failure. "12 
Emerson's and Just's criticisms were aimed at the 
film's historical inaccuracies, such as the Vietnamese being 
12 Lance Morrow, "Vietnam Comes Home," Time, 23 April, 
1979, 22-24. 
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shown as devoted to Russian roulette. Others overlooked the 
flaws or were not aware of them and were moved by The 
Deerhunter's tale of redblooded Americans shattered by the 
war. John Ketwig was reminded of his own experiences in 
Vietnam and " .•. started shaking uncontrollably, and then 
I was crying, and I had to leave the theater for a 
cigarette. ,,13 Ironically, The Deerhunter and Coming Home 
shared something significant: in different ways, they were 
sympathetic towards veterans and put them in the national 
spotlight. 
The other main development in recognizing Vietnam 
veterans was the Iranian hostage crisis of November 1979, 
which sparked a resurgence of nationalism and a kinder view 
of the military. Angry demonstrations against Iranians took 
place across the country, with 1,500 Texans marching in 
front of the Iranian consulate in Houston and a crowd in 
Springfield, Massachusetts, throwing rocks, bottles and eggs 
at Iranian students who marched against the Shah of Iran. 
George Ball, Undersecretary of State for John Kennedy and 
Lyndon Johnson and a famous early critic of the Vietnam War, 
said, "In terms of domestic politics, this has put an end to 
the Vietnam syndrome," the national self-doubt over 
13 Ketwig, 32. 
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America's role in world affairs. 1( John White, national 
chairman of the Democratic Party, said, "We may have reached 
a turning point in our attitude toward ourselves, and that 
is a feeling that we have a right to protect legitimate 
American interests anywhere in the world. "15 
When the crisis ended in January 1981 and the former 
hostages were welcomed as returning heroes, Vietnam veterans 
noted the contrast between their own reception and the one 
unfolding. Said one veteran, "When I got back from Vietnam 
with shrapnel in both of my legs I was considered a 
drug-crazed babykiller. When the hostages come back they 
get a giant applause--for what? For getting caught, that's 
what. It's damned unfair. "16 Other veterans voiced the 
same sentiment in the media, and sympathy for them steadily 
mounted. Robert Muller, a founder of the Vietnam Veterans 
of America, called the hostages' return "'the single most 
important event to benefit Vietnam veterans.,"17 
Observers noted the change in public attitude toward 
veterans. Myra MacPherson said she was "stunned at how the 
14 Hedrick Smith, "Crisis Alters Attitudes In U.S.," New 
York Times, 29 November, 1979, section I, p. 1. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Washington Post, 31 January, 1981, section I, p. 9. 
11 MacPherson, 56. 
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public's awareness of Vietnam veterans had changed 
dramatically in less than two years--from 1979 to 1981 ... 18 . 
James Webb, veteran, war novelist and later Ronald Reagan's 
Secretary of the Navy, recalled two different tours he made 
in promoting his books: 
I did a hardback tour in the fall of '78 and a paperback 
tour in in the summer of '79 ..•• And the difference 
in one year was phenomenal. I was lucky to get out of 
Boston alive in '78. I was called a murderer. I was 
asked if I shot heroin, the whole bit. In 1978 in 
Milwaukee I was doing a call-in show and a guy actually 
stopped the show and broke for a commerical and turned 
around and said, 'Do you realize you're the first guy 
who ever came in here without first apologizing for 
having been in Vietnam?' That was in 1978. Yet by 1979, 
the mood was dififerent. The whole attitudinal referent 
was different." 
In June 1979, the nation celebrated Vietnam Veterans 
Week. President Jimmy Carter spoke to a gathering of 
veterans at the White House, saying the United States was 
"ready to change its heart, its mind and its attitude about 
the men who fought the war ...• We love you for what you 
were and what you stood for--and we love you for what you 
are and what you stand for." The commemorative week was 
the work of nineteen Congressmen who served in Vietnam.&O 
18 Ibid. 
19 Horne, 152. 
20 Time, 11 June, 1979, 21. 
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By the spring of 1981, after the return of the hostages 
in Iran, the honoring of Vietnam veterans was in full swing. 
On April 26, a national day of recognition was proclaimed by 
President Ronald Reagan after veterans had complained 
about their treatment in comparison to the hostages,.21 In 
October a number of rock and roll performers, including the 
enormously popular Bruce Springsteen, donated the proceeds 
of a concert in Los Angeles to the Vietnam Veterans of 
America. 2Z Half of the December 14 issue of Newsweek 
formed a 20,000-word special report on the survivors of an 
American unit in Vietnam, Charlie Company, recounting their 
experiences during and after the war. 23 Noted the New 
Republic, "In the press, concern over indifferences toward 
the Vietnam veteran has reached epidemic proportions. ,,24 
Samuel Freedman wrote an article in the New York Times 
which examined the Vietnam veteran's transformation in the 
public eye, from war criminal in the 1960s to gun-toting 
drug addict in the 1970s to romantic hero in the 1980s. 
Freedman noted that many of the movies, novels, plays and 
21 Washington Post, 27 April, 1981, section III, p. 1. 
22 Steve Pond, "Rock Stars Rally To Help vets," Rolling 
Stone, 15 October, 1981, 68. 
23 Newsweek, 12 December, 1981. 
24 Timothy Noah, "The Vet Offensive," New Republic, 1 
August 1981, 23. 
poems about the war were produced by veterans and 
virtually all of the art concerned them. By the early 
eighties the veteran was even a sex symbol in such 
successful commercial ventures as the television show 
Magnum, P.I." starring heartthrob Tom Selleck, and the 
Missing In Action movies of karate showman Chuck Norris. 
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The most common portrayal of veterans, said Freedman, was 
the "survivor as hero," a man who had fought a senseless war 
in Asia and returned home to an ungrateful, sometimes 
hostile America. He was grim but proud, and Freedman quoted 
Harvard historian Alan Brinkley in underscoring the appeal 
of such a figure for Americans. Said Brinkley, litHe's 
someone who's been through the fire and come out stronger, 
someone who's been tested by failure, someone who's been 
betrayed--either by his leaders for not being allowed to 
fight without restraints or, more moderately, by his country 
for being sent at all. That's a theme in a lot of the 
literature.,,,25 John Milius, who co-authored the script for 
Apocalypse Now, predicted the Vietnam veteran would become 
"the most romanticized war hero in American history. ,,26 
Freedman believed the newfound respect for Vietnam 
veterans was the one point of consensus Americans had on the 
25 Freedman, 51. 
26 Ibid., 52. 
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war. 27 Max Cleland, an amputee veteran who directed the 
Veterans Administration under Jimmy Carter, alluded to the 
same general idea when he noted, "Within the soul of each 
Vietnam veteran, there is probably something that says, tBad 
war, good soldier.' "28 Americans at large seemed to agree. 
A Harris poll conducted for the Veterans Administration in 
1979 showed that 62 percent believed the veterans "were made 
suckers" and were victims, not perpetrators, of the war. 
The war itself was repudiated by better than a three to one 
margin. 29 
One veteran may have spoken for many of his comrades in 
an unsigned letter left at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in 
Washington. Addressed to those in his unit who were killed 
in combat, the letter was a mixture of pride, profanity, 
confusion and cynical acknowledgement. 
A 'Nam vet is in the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier 
and the 101st Airborne built a monument paid for by the 
alumni association. On it are names like Lam Son 719, 
Bong Ap, Ripcord, Hamburger Hill, Ashau •• 
They make dumb movies about the war--one guy wrote 
a book about the 13th Valley--Texas Star. • • • At first 
it was like some bum trip and never happened. Now they 
have parades and shit. Guess time does that •••• 
Can't think of you guys as angels. More like 
Valhalla, drinking beer, pissing foam, counting days 
'til we go home. Sometimes I sit in the dark and 
smoke--I see you in the smoke not like ghosts, but 
27 Ibid., 51. 
28 Time, "A Homecoming At Last," 22 November 1982, 44. 
29 New York Times, 11 November 1979, 30. 
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sitting calm--waiting to move out •••• 
People ask if it was worth it? No one really 
knows. Would we do it again? Hell yes, don't ask why. 
We were the best infantry company in the fucking 
world. • . . 
I went to this deal with my boss--A guy wrote a 
book about Bloods--at the end they asked Viet vets to 
stand up--I did--I did for all of us--people 
clapped--what the fuck--I think they meant it--wish you 
were there--maybe you were. 
I feel better writing this-~remember June 6? Why 
don't you shitheads ever write? 
Personalizing The War 
(The Vietnam Veterans Memorial And Other Tributes) 
In 1979 a 29-year-old veteran named Jan Scruggs saw The 
Deerhunter and could not sleep that night. He stayed up in 
his kitchen with a bottle of whiskey, replaying the war in 
his mind. Scruggs kept thinking that nobody remembered the 
names of all the fallen American soldiers. The next morning 
he told his wife he was going to build a memorial to them. 
"It'll have the name of everyone killed," he said. 31 Thus 
began the creation of the national Vietnam Veterans 
30 Edelman, 236-239. 
31 Scruggs, 7. 
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Memorial. 
The non-profit Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund was 
established in April 1979 by Scruggs, Washington attorney 
and fellow veteran Jack Wheeler and another veteran and 
attorney, Bob Doubek. Relying solely on private 
contributions--no government money was used--they set out to 
raise funds and found the going slow. To hasten progress, 
Scruggs called on one of his senators, Charles Mathias, Jr., 
a Republican from Maryland, who would lend his support in 
crucial ways. First, he proposed a bill which would 
designate a specific site for the memorial. Second, he met 
with Interior Department officials and helped pick the site. 
According to legend, Mathias scanned a map of Washington and 
put his thumb on a spot he liked. 
official. 
The official gulped. "Sure is a good site, Senator." 
It was on the Mall, in a place called Constitutional 
Gardens, right next to the Lincoln Memorial. 3Z 
Mathias's bill was co-sponsored by liberal George 
McGovern and conservative Barry Goldwater and later passed 
the Senate unanimously. President Carter signed it into law 
on June 31, 1980. Noting the symbolism of the memorial 
32 Ibid., 12-16. 
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site, Mathias said, "A location on the Mall is symbolically 
appropriate. We can all recall when the Mall was the 
battleground of opinion and dissent regarding the American 
role in Vietnam. Its proximity to the Lincoln memorial is 
also fitting, for not since the Civil War had this nation 
suffered wounds and divisions as grievous as those endured 
over Vietnam. ,,33 Senator John Warner, a Virginia 
Republican, assisted in the fundraising, and eventually a 
National Sponsoring Committee was formed that included the 
likes of First Lady Roslynn Carter, former President Gerald 
Ford, retired General William Westmoreland and entertainer 
Bob Hope. 34 The idea of a memorial was widely touted. 
Turning to the memorial's design, the Memorial Fund 
decided to hold an open competition and let a carefully 
chosen jury, including prominent sculptures and landscape 
architects, select a winner to be approved by the Fine Arts 
Commission, the National Capital Planning Commission and the 
Secretary of Interior. The contest's rules were simply that 
the winning design must feature the names of American 
soldiers killed in Vietnam, Jan Scrugg's original idea; that 
it must be horizontal, so as not to clash with the Lincoln 
memorial; that it must be landscaped to suit its garden 
33 Ibid., 23. 
34 Ibid. 
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setting; and that it must make no political statement 
whatsoever. The contest drew 1,421 entrees. It was won, to 
everyone's surprise, by a 22-year-old student from Yale 
University who was born the year of America's first casualty 
in Vietnam. Her name was Maya Lin. 35 
While there had been no controversy over the idea of a 
memorial to Vietnam veterans--indeed, little ever passed 
Congress so quickly--there was a firestorm over Maya Lin's 
design. It provided for two long walls of black granite, 
buried in a glen on the Mall, the walls meeting and sloping 
downward, each forming a point on the ground. One wall 
pointed toward the Washington Monument, the other toward the 
Lincoln Memorial. The names of the 57,692 Americans killed 
in Vietnam were to be inscribed on the walls in the order 
they fell. At its center, where the walls would meet, the 
memorial would be ten feet high. The granite would be 
finely polished, so visitors could see their own 
reflection. 3S The strong objections to this unusual design 
were summarized by the National Review: 
Okay, so we lost the Vietnam War. Okay, the thing 
was mismanaged from start to finish. But the American 
soldiers who died in Vietnam fought for their country 
and for the freedom of others, and they deserve better 
than the outrage that has been approved as their 
35 Ibid., 49-66. 
3S Washington Post, 3 January 1982, section VI, p. 9. 
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memorial in the nation's capital •• 
Our objection to this Orwellian glop is based 
upon the clear political message of this design. The 
design says that the Vietnam War should be memorialized 
in black, not in the white marble of Washington. The 
mode of listing the names makes them individual deaths, 
not deaths in a cause: they might as well have been 
traffic accidents. The invisibility of the monument at 
ground level symbolizes the tunmentionability' of the 
war •.•• Finally, the V-shaped plan of the black 
retaining wall immortalizes the anti-war signal, the V 
protest made with the fingers •••. If the current 
model has to be built, stick it off in some tidal flat, 
and let it memorialize Jane Fonda's contributio~ to 
ensuring that our soldiers died in vain . • • • 
Secretary of the Interior James Watt was thought to be 
displeased with the ~emorial design, and he had the 
authority to delay its construction. In January 1982, Watt 
sent the Memorial Fund a letter saying, in effect, that 
construction was on hold until a compromise was reached on 
the design. Watt wanted to add two elements: a statue of 
American soldiers and an American flag. After much 
wrangling, the compromise was struck. 3S Construction 
resumed and the memorial was ultimately finished on 
schedule and dedicated on Veterans Day in November 1982. 
Over 250,000 people descended upon Washington for the 
dedication ceremonies. Some 15,000 marched in a parade 
through the capital's streets, grouped by state in 
alphabetical order. Alabama was first, led by General 
31 National Review, 18 September 1981, 1064. 
38 Scruggs, 85-101. 
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Westmoreland himself, who carried two small American 
flags. Veterans of other wars cheered from the roadside. 
With many of them wearing blue jeans and old fatigues and 
other assorted casuals, the paraders more resembled Coxey's 
Army than any official military review. As the parade 
spilled forward, strangers walked up to veterans and shook 
their hands, or waved flags and appreciative signs from the 
sidewalk. Herbie Petit, a machinist and Marine veteran from 
New Orleans, told a reporter how he and some former Marine 
colleagues were cheered in a restaurant by a group of 
college students. "The whole week," he said, "it was worth 
it just for that."39 
From Wednesday, November 10, to Friday the twelfth, 
volunteers at the National Cathedral read the names of the 
57,939 Americans known to be killed or missing in Vietnam. 
The names were read alphabetically, by candlelight. Each 
volunteer read for half an hour. President Ronald Reagan 
and his wife Nancy attended the name-reading ceremony for 20 
minutes, and as he left Reagan told reporters in a choked 
voice, "The names that are being read are of men who died 
for freedom just as surely as any men who ever fought for 
this country .• We're just beginning to appreciate that 
39 Washington Post, 14 November 1982, section I, p. 10. 
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they were fighting for a just cause. "40 At the official 
dedication ceremony, Jan Scruggs read aloud a letter from 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger which said, "When 
your country called, you came. When your country refused 
you honor, you remained silent. With time, our nation's 
wounds have healed. We have finally come to appreciate your 
sacrifices and to pay you your tribute you so richly 
deserve.n(l Most high-ranking military officers did not 
attend the dedication ceremonies. The local Mount Vernon 
chapter of the retired officers' association, one of the 
largest chapters in the country, could send only six of its 
more than 600 members. 42 
The generally positive feelings about the memorial's 
dedication did not extinguish the debate over its design. 
In building his own case against it, writer Tod Lindberg 
quoted architect and fellow critic of the memorial William 
Hubbard: 
The objections to the monument were, in essence, 
that it did not glorify the war in ways that other 
monuments had--the Iwo Jima Monument being one 
frequently cited example. Now clearly a monument 
equating Vietnam with World War Two ••• would have been 
a sham, a lie. But behind the call for glorification is 
the assumption that a momument--any monument--should 
make concrete some shared idea about the thing it 
40 1 Ibid., p. • 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
commemorates. In short, a monument should speak. In 
that sense, the objections stand4fnaddressed: The 
Vietnam monument does not speak. 
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Lindberg himself said the memorial did speak. Whereas 
the Iwo Jima memorial and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier 
depicted anonymous men, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
depicted individuals, the emphasis being less on the cause 
and more on the people. Lindberg believed this was an 
extension of the personal manner in which the war was 
reported, noting a belief had grown that to fully understand 
war one must see it from the common soldier's perspective, 
which was a "truer" one than the more abstract perspective 
of generals or politicians. This was the same idea that lay 
behind so much of the war's literature, written for the most 
part by common soldiers. Lindberg pointed to the example of 
a well-known article in the New Yorker magazine by Jonathan 
Schell, "The Village of Ben Suc," a graphic, personal 
account of efforts to rid a riverside village of Viet Congo 
Life magazine, with its riveting photography, was another 
example. Lindberg called such an approach the "radical 
personalization" of war and said--correctly, if the Vietnam 
War literature was an accurate measure--that it had come to 
f3 Tod Lindberg, "Of Arms, men And Monuments," Commentary 
(October 1984), 51. 
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dominate American discussion of war in general. 44 
Lindberg further stated that the personal approach was 
an apolitical one: 
. • • an attempt to sever the soldier from any 
connection with his nation's purposes and policies. III 
the new understanding, soldiers are no longer agents of 
their country but simply individuals caught in extremely 
trying circumstances. If they fight, they fight to stay 
alive, or perhaps, at best, to keep their friends alive. 
If they kill, they may justly be called murderers •.• 
or, perhaps, victims of a higher senselessness. If they 
die, they die for nothing, victims again •••• without 
the context supplied by political understanding, no 
moral credit can in fact attach itself to the soldier's 
efforts. 
• • . one can explain how and why such violence is 
necessary, and thereby help to restore the soldier to 
his proper status as an agent, sometimes a heroic agent, 
of broader political and moral principles.4~-
Lindberg concluded that the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
said the war was meaningless, senseless. In his view, it 
should have said the war was fought for the defense of 
freedom, the containment of Communism and the loyalty of 
allies. 46 
Essayist Charles Krauthammer had similar criticisms. 
After visiting the memorial, he said, "the feeling of waste 
and emptiness would not leave me." He elaborated: 
The Vietnam memorial filled me with an overwhelming 
feeling of desolation. I had come prepared for the 
funereal black; I had come prepared for the fifty-seven 
H Ibid., 52-53. 
45 Ibid., 54-55. 
46 Ibid., 56. 
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thousand names, that inconceivable ocean of suffering. 
I had not come prepared to find myself, with them, below 
the earth •••. I had the feeling of being before.
1 
a 
vast, open grave containing not bodies but names. 4: 
Krauthammer clearly received from the memorial a 
message of death, which appeared to be what the designer 
wished to communicate. Maya Lin admitted to a fascination 
with death, partly a result of reading existential 
philosophy. She once remarked, "Everyone knows I'm 
morbid. "48 When living in New Haven as a student at Yale, 
one of her favorite retreats was the Grove Street Cemetery, 
a place she found peaceful. Interestingly, she had never 
had an experience with death, had not closely known anyone 
who died. "We are supposedly the only creature that 
realizes its mortality," she said. "Man reacts to that by 
denying its existence. That's always disturbed me." 49 
As for the American dead in Vietnam, "They died: You have to 
accept that fact before you can really, truly recognize them 
d b th ,,50 an remem er em. 
Naturally, Krauthammer and other critics found the 
memorial not just unglorious but discomforting. Its starting 
47 Charles Krauthammer, New Republic, 6 December 1982, 42. 
48 Washington Post, 3 January 1982, section VI, p. 9. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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point for remembering the Vietnam veterans was not a grand 
cause or such qualities as sacrifice, bravery, duty, honor. 
It was simply death with no meaning supplied, though the 
memorial's unimposing and easily overlooked inscription did 
pay homage to traditional soldierly virtues: "Our nation 
remembers the courage, sacrifice, and devotion to duty of 
its Vietnam veterans." 51 Maya Lin had originally wanted no 
. . t' h t 52 1nscr1p 10n w a soever. 
W.D. Ehrhart put his own objections to the memorial in 
verse: 
I didn't want a monument 
not even one as sober as that 
vast black wall of broken lives. . . . 
What I wanted was a simple recognition 
of the limits of our power as a nation 
to inflict our will on others. 
What I wanted was an understanding 
that the world is neither black-and-white 
nor ours. 
What I wanted 
53 
was an end to monuments. 
51 Scruggs, 80. 
52 McConnell, 75. 
53 Ehrhart, 103. 
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Later, Ehrhart would say about the memorial, "What does 
it reveal in terms of the veterans experience? In my 
opinion, I would honestly have to answer, nothing.,,54 Peter 
Marin quoted Roland Barthes in expressing his own 
skepticism. Barthes had said that cultural myths 
" •. serve two functions at once: they commemorate the 
past but also disguise it, they make it both more and less 
th h t . t ,,55 an w a 1 was .••. Marin's point was identical to 
W.D. Ehrhart's, that the Vietnam Veterans Memorial did not 
convey the war as harshly as it was. Marin recognized that 
this would have been impossible: "one can hardly expect 
images of napalmed children and weeping parents • " 
Yet, he said, "it would be unfortunate for all of us, 
including the veterans, if the memorial had the effect of 
closing the door on the past or trying to heal the wounds it 
left behind--as if, in the words of a veteran I met 
recently, (everything was all right now, all hunky-dory, 
we're all friends again ••. and the war itself will be 
forgotten. ,,56 Marin touched upon two important points in 
the postwar debate, or the non-debate, as some would have 
54 Lomperis, Reading The Wind, 30. 
55 Peter Marin, "What The Vets Can Teach Us," Nation, 27 
November, 1982, 54. 
56 Ibid., 54. 
77 
said. First, if the memorial did begin to close the door on 
the real past the irony would have been rich, for Jan 
Scruggs said repeatedly that the memorial would serve as an 
initial step toward remembering the war. Second, the war 
itself, the complex political drama that siezed the nation's 
attention as it claimed thousands of American lives, seemed 
to have been forgotten well before the memorial was built. 
A few suggested that the memorial's ambiguity, or its 
lack of stated theme, might leave the door to the past open. 
An anonymous poet left this seemingly sympathetic bit of 
verse at the wall: 
Understand 
That if the time comes 
When you must kill 
It will destroy you 
For all of this life. 
This is the horrible legacy 
of glorifying war 
Which no one escapes 
Who is the deadliest 
Adversary; 
The soldier 
The truth 
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or the monument ?57 
Robert Brugger, a former Marine captain, was cautiously 
optimistic in a letter to the Washington Post: 
Monuments are useful because they help to place 
ourselves on the historical landscape and somehow thank 
the dead. But they may also hinder our view of what has 
gone before. As symbols that simplify, they have the 
power to distort as well as to inspire. Perhaps 
memorial architect Maya Lin's call to memory will prove 
an exception--offering a chastened conception of war, 
inviting us to remember the actual tragedy of this war 
of doubtful ends and horrendous means. Maybe its 
message of muted bravado will sink in, and all of us, 
like the men and women matured by the Vierfam 
experience, will stand the better for it. 
For all the barbs it drew, the Vietnam Veterans 
Memorial seemed to have been a critical and popular success. 
Within several years it became one of the most visited 
attractions in Washington. One editorial said, "This 
austere jumble is extraordinarily personal, it appears. 
Some have said they think the memorial is too negative; 
perhaps they have spoken before seeing its powerful effect 
. . t ,,59 on Vl.Sl. ors. Scenes of visitors crying and veterans 
embracing became commonplace, and remarkable was the quickly 
established custom of leaving writings and mementoes at the 
57 Laura Palmer, ed., Shrapnel In The Heart: Letters And 
Remembrances From The Vietnam Veterans Memorial (New York: 
Random House, 1987), section I, p. 18. 
58 Washington Post, 17 November, 1982, section I, p. 18. 
59 New Republic, 6 December 1982, 39. 
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wall, making it, in the technological parlance of the 
information age, an interactive memorial. The custom began 
when a veteran dropped his purple heart into wet cement as 
the memorial's foundation was being built. At last count, 
more than 6,000 offerings had been left, each completely 
personal: snapshots, poems, flags of all description, teddy 
bears, packs of cigarettes, harmonicas, cans of C-rations, 
playing cards, Bibles, a blue high heel. It was all 
collected and preserved in an Interior Department warehouse, 
every i tern tagged and dated. 60 
A half-sized replica of the memorial was brought to 
cities around the country, and in Eugene, Oregon, a woman 
named Carole Page left a note at the replica in memory of a 
former boyfriend. Several days later she returned to the 
site and found an unsigned note addressed to her: 
Dear Carole, 
I did come home in the hearts and minds of each of 
the living. Every man and woman that came back brought 
a part of me. I have talked to you with their voices 
and loved you with their hearts. Don't be scared for I 
am always with you. I will always be there in t~e still 
of the night. Be still, you will hear my voice. 
In the New Yorker magazine's Talk Of The Town section, 
an unnamed writer called the memorial "an excerpt from 
reality": 
60 Palmer, xvi-xvii. 
61 Ibid., 96. 
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••. pure data that haven't been tampered with ••.• 
candid and free of emotional clutter. • • • In a way, we 
[Americans] wish to believe that our own perceptions are 
sufficiently good, clear-eyed and sound, that our 
interpretation of the data, not someone else's, is what 
matters, and the closer we are to the unmanipulated, 
undoctored source the better--the greater the likelihood 
that some truth will be obtained. This is democratic. 
It's American to distrust incantations and obscurihies, 
to want to go straight to the heart of the matter. 
Bruce Weigl, a Vietnam veteran and poet, wrote of "the 
terrible grace of Maya Lin's wall" and added, "in the cold 
wind blowing off the reflecting pool beyond Maya Lin's wall, 
you could pick up your head again; you could believe that 
you had finally come home."63 Another veteran said upon 
visiting the memorial, "Until today, it [leaving the war] 
was like walking out in the middle of a movie. A day like 
today makes you feel it's over."64 Conservative columnist 
James Kilpatrick believed the memorial would be "the most 
moving war memorial ever constructed," offering "none of the 
b b " . th 1i5 om ast seen 1n 0 ers. He said further: 
This memorial has a pile driver's impact. No politics. 
No recriminations. Nothing of vainglory or of glory 
either. For 20 years I have contended that these men 
died in a cause as noble as any cause for which a war 
62 New Yorker, 18 March 1985, 35-36. 
63 Bruce Weigel, "Welcome Home," Nation, 27 November, 
1982, 549. 
64 New York Times, 11 November 1984, section I, p. 28. 
65 James J. Kilpatrick, Washington Post, 11 November 
1981, section I, p. 27. 
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was ever waged. Others have contended, and will always 
contend, that these dead were uselessly sacrificed in a 
no-win war that should never have been waged at all. 
Never mind. The memorial carries a ~essage for all 
ages: this is what war is all about. 
The memorial in Washington was hardly the only tribute 
to the Vietnam War and its veterans. By 1986, 143 memorials 
had either been built or planned. In New Castle, Delaware, 
there was a statue of a black soldier carrying a dying white 
comrade. In Kansas City, Missouri, there was a series of 
pools arranged in ever-growing size to symbolize the gradual 
growth of America's involvement in Vietnam. In Cushing, 
Minnesota, a veteran planted a forest of 25,000 trees in 
commemoration. Some of the memorials, such as the one in 
Delaware, spoke of the civil rights movement as well as the 
war. A proposed memorial on the Mississippi River in 
Memphis, Tennessee, would show an ethnically mixed squad in 
combat. According to the Project on the Vietnam Generation, 
a nonprofit group studying the men and women who came of age 
during the war, the memorials were mostly the work of 
Americans between the ages of thirty-two and forty-nine. 61 
Some tributes were even more personal than the 
Washington memorial. In 1971 Victor Westphall, a retired 
66 Ibid., 21 September 1982, section I, p. 19. 
61 "Vietnam Memorials Underway Nationwide," ibid., section 
I, pp. 8-9. 
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building contractor with a Ph.D. in history, finished his 
own memorial in the barren hills of Eagle Nest, New Mexico. 
The creation was primarily for his son, David, but was for 
all others slain in Vietnam as well. The Vietnam Veterans 
Peace and Brotherhood Chapel was two long, low triangles, 
side by side, looming over the Moreno Valley as if wings 
come to rest. A small chapel sat between the wings. Inside 
the chapel were photographs of dead soldiers, with popular 
music of the war years piped in. At night the chapel was 
floodlit. Victor Westphall built the memorial largely 
with his own hands and money. He lived alone, in a small 
cabin on the hillside beneath his creation. Sa 
Ben and Miriam McDermott of Nashville, Tennessee, paid 
tribute in a manner that may have been common among the 
families of dead soldiers. The McDermotts converted their 
back porch, where their fallen son Ben, Jr., used to sleep, 
into a sort of family museum. It contained Ben, Jr.'s 
Marine saber, some of his military emblems mounted and 
framed, the flag which draped his coffin, his karate belts, 
snapshots of him in Vietnam, a picture of him in his 
football jersey. "We just kind of dedicated the room to 
him," said Ben, Sr. "I don't know if other families do 
68 New York Times, 13 November 1982, section I, p. 8. 
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this, but sometimes we kind of feel like he's here.,,69 
Thus in countless ways the Vietnam War was personalized 
in memory. Jan Scruggs was not alone in insisting that the 
names of the dead be remembered. Among many others of like 
mind, Michael Norman, a veteran and a reporter for the New 
York Times, said: 
I wanted to forget almost everything else, but 
never, never the names. They stayed with me--Iong after 
the smell of the field and the echo of the guns, long 
after that moment when a rainstorm was finally just a 
rainstorm and not the assault of a jungle monsoon. My 
uniforms lost their fit. My rifleman's eyes took on 
glasses. But I always remembered the names. 
. • • I came home quickly from the war--no drinks 
with the boys down at the Legion Hall, no parades or 
veterans' protests in the streets. But I tried, tried 
often during the last 16 years, not to forget the 
names •.•. Jim Payne of Glendale, California. Jim 
Parsons of Warsaw, Missouri. Tommy Gonzales of 
Beeville, Texas. It was, in part, a matter of duty, one 
marine kfieping alive the memory of others--semper 
fidelis. 0 
Like the literature of the veterans, the nation's 
remembrance of the Vietnam experience was personal. The 
monuments and other expressions remembered the men and women 
touched by the war, not the cause itself. 
69 Palmer, 23. 
70 Michael Norman, "For Us The War Is Over," New York 
Times, 31 March, 1985, p. 64. 
CHAPTER 4 
A LESSON IS DRAWN 
Various Early Lessons 
Because the Vietnam War was for the most part 
remembered personally instead of politically, it may have 
seemed as though no national lessons were drawn from the 
experience. Referring to the war's portrayal in fiction, 
Samuel Freedman asked whether "the totality of individual 
artistic responses ••• amounted to a national response."1 
The veterans who chronicled their own experiences tended to 
be wary of lessons. Tim O'Brien referred to the war as 
"simple event. . . . A war like any war. No new messages. "2 
He also wrote, "Can the foot soldier teach anything 
important about war, merely for having been there? I think 
not. He can tell war stories."3 Of his book Rumor Of War, 
Phillip Caputo said, "It might, perhaps, prevent the next 
generation from being crucified in the next war. But I 
Freedman, 55. 
2 O'Brien, Cacciato, 288-289. 
3 O'Brien, Combat Zone, 23. 
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don't think so."4 
But even though the American public did not truly 
debate the Vietnam War after 1975, even though the war's 
political history and the Vietnamese were largely forgotten, 
numerous lessons were drawn and some applied. For President 
Jimmy Carter, elected the year after the war ended, the 
American role in Vietnam offered guiding ideas about foreign 
policy. Carter promised to conduct foreign affairs more 
openly and morally, with a stronger commitment to human 
rights than to containing Communism at every turn. Military 
adventures were not in favor. As a presidential candidate, 
Carter referred to "the quagmires of Cambodia and Vietnam" 
and said, "I would never • . • openly or covertly, legally 
or illegally, support nations who stand for principles on 
which their own people violently disagree and which are 
completely antithetical to what we believe in."5 In a 
televised address in 1979, President Carter cited the war as 
a major cause of America's "malaise," saying, "We were 
taught that our armies were invincible and and our causes 
always just, only to suffer the agony of Vietnam. "6 
4 Caputo, xix. 
5 Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1986), 30. 
6 Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith (New York: Bantam Books, 
1982), 120. 
86 
Carter seemed to believe the Vietnam War was a profound 
moral mistake, not only a strategic one. He was reluctant 
to intervene militarily overseas, though in 1980, his last 
year in office, he unsuccessfully sent forces to free the 
hostages in Iran and proclaimed the Carter Doctrine to 
defend the Persian Gulf oil lanes. Critics termed such 
reluctance the "Vietnam syndrome," saying Carter and his 
like were traumatized by the Vietnam War and indecisive in 
conducting foreign policy. One such critic, Robert Tucker, 
said, "So long as the nation's collective memory of Vietnam 
is determined by the conventional view of this war [Carter's 
contrite view], it will be difficult for us to act with the 
pride and assurance we require. In a word, the 
rehabilitation of American foreign policy depends on the 
rehabilitation of Vietnam."? 
Carter was joined by many others in seeking lessons 
from the war. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 
December 1979 there ensued a debate on whether they had 
entered their own Vietnam. S When the Reagan Administration 
in 1981 increased military assistance to the government of 
El Salvador, which was fighting Communist guerillas, critics 
compared the scenario to the early days of American 
7 Robert Tucker, "Spoil of Defeat: Rationalizing 
Vietnam," Harper's, 11 November, 1981, 87. 
8 Time, "Kabul Is Not Saigon," 10 March 1980, 32. 
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involvement in Vietnam. Clarence Long, a Democratic 
Congressman from Maryland, said, "This administration is 
making the same kinds of mistakes that an administration of 
my own party was making 18 years ago."g In 1982 Congressman 
Bill Alexander, an Arkansas Democrat, said, "Most people 
don't know where EI Salvador is, but the ghost of Vietnam 
hangs over every instance of military support or action in a 
foreign country. ,,10 When an American advisor was reported 
carrying a rifle in EI Salvador--only pistols were 
permitted--the story made headlines across the nation and 
President Reagan was forced to bring the man home. When an 
American intelligence ship was reported off the Salvadoran 
coast, comparisons were made with the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident .11 
In 1983, the Vietnam War was invoked as reason to 
withdraw troops from Beirut, where they were stationed to 
enforce an elusive peace. Congressman John McCain, an 
Arizona Republican and former prisoner of war in Vietnam, 
said, "The longer we stay in Lebanon, the harder it will be 
for us to leave. We will be trapped by the case we make for 
403. 
9 National Review, "No More Vietnams," 17 April 1981, 
10 New Republic, "The Vietnam Analogy," 17 March 1982, 7. 
11 Ibid. 
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having our troops there in the first place. "12 Conservative 
Democratic Senator John Stennis of Mississippi intoned that 
he had supported his leaders for too long during the 
Vietnam War and that this time we would not "gO for it."13 
The lessons of the war briefly became an issue between 
Senator Gary Hart and former Vice President Walter Mondale 
during the 1984 Democratic primaries. Hart said his own 
foreign policy views were formed during the war, signifying 
a generational divide between himself and the older Mondale, 
whose views were formed during World War Two and the early 
Cold War. Hart criticized Mondale for favoring the 
continued presence of American advisors in Honduras and for 
being late in calling for the withdrawal of the troops in 
Beirut. Mondale responded by saying Hart had learned the 
"wrong lesson" from the Vietnam War, the idea that any 
American intervention was foolish. According to Mondale, 
the right lesson was that there were limits to American 
power, but that the United States still needed to playa 
strong international role. 14 
It was common for someone of Hart's generation to cite 
the war as the major influence on their foreign policy 
12 MacPherson, 609. 
13 Ibid. 
14 New York Times, 4 April 1984, section VIII, p. 9. 
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thinking. Mike Synar, a Democratic Congressman from 
Oklahoma who admitted the war had made him suspicious of 
military actions, said, "We learned that anything military 
has to have the support of the American people. I come from 
a hawki8h state where you'd think people really would look 
at Central America as a place where we draw the line, but I 
don't think they're buying the president's rhetoric. fll5 
Another young congressman, Republican Newt Gingrich of 
Georgia, said, "Our generation is much more fascinated with 
foreign policy than our elders were. From my bias, I feel 
that many members of Congress on the left were 'vaccinated' 
by Vietnam. The driving moral argument for antiwar 
Democrats is still Vietnam. • . ,,16 
The Weinberger Doctrine 
In a campaign speech before the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars in August 1980, Ronald Reagan said of the Vietnam War, 
. . • it's time we recognized that ours, in truth, was a " 
noble cause. We dishonored the memory of 50,000 young 
15 Washington Post, 15 April 1985, section I, p. 18. 
16 Ibid. 
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Americans who died in that cause when we gave way to 
feelings of guilt as if we were doing something shameful.,,17 
To reporter Elizabeth Drew in a private interview, Reagan, 
in reference to his opponent Jimmy Carter's description of 
the war as "moral poverty," said, "When fifty thousand 
people, young Americans, give their lives to protect the 
people of a small country, a defenseless country, against 
godless Communist tyranny, I think it is an act of 
collective courage, not moral poverty. ,,18 
Reagan's remarks were treated in the media as gaffes, 
for no serious candidate for national office since 1975 had 
uttered such sentiments, but Reagan did not apologize for 
them. To the contrary, he held fast to his belief in the 
Vietnam War's justness. In 1985 Reagan was asked for his 
thoughts on the tenth anniversary of the war's end and he 
said, ". the truth of the matter is that we did have 
victory. We continue to talk about losing that war. We 
didn't lose that war. We won virtually every major 
engagement. . When the North Vietnamese did violate the 
treaty and the then-administration asked Congress for an 
appropriation to keep our word, Congress refused. ,,19 
17 New York Times, 19 August 1980, section I, p. 1. 
18 Elizabeth Drew, Portrait Of An Election (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1981), 175. 
19 New York Times, 19 April 1985, section I, p. 9. 
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Judging from the election results, Reagan's remarks 
during the 1980 campaign did not greatly offend the public. 
Indeed, his subject was not whether to fight such a war 
again but whether Americans should feel ashamed of their 
role, or their motives, in Vietnam. Coming in the midst of 
the Iranian hostage ordeal and the surge of nationalism it 
generated, Reagan's moral defense of the war may have 
actually helped his cause. But it was a moral defense only, 
not a strategic one. It was, in general, of the same 
variety as Norman Podhoretz's and Richard Nixon's arguments. 
When Elizabeth Drew asked Reagan about the strategic wisdom 
of fighting the Vietnam War, Reagan replied, "I was one who 
never believed we should have gone in. I've always believed 
in the [General Douglas] MacArthur dictum that you don't get 
involved in a land war in Asia. But the troops were sent 
in; once we sent them in, then you have made a commitment to 
the men you're asking to fight that you are going to give 
them every resource to win this thing and get them home as 
. bl ,,20 soon as POSSl e. 
This post-war assessment of military interventions, 
emphasizing the need to strike forcefully and win quickly 
rather than allowing events to be prolonged, was put into 
policy by Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, 
20 Drew, 118. 
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in November 1984. The so-called Weinberger Doctrine set 
conditions for deploying troops abroad: the public must 
clearly understand and support the action, so the nation 
could muster the will for a decisive victory. Said 
Weinberger, "Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, 
there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the 
support of the American people and their elected 
representatives in Congress. We cannot fight a battle with 
the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war 
overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our 
troops not to win but just to be there."B Weinberger later 
elaborated on his doctrine, noting, "There's still a very 
strong feeling against any kind of United States involvement 
in actions that require military force. That's one of the 
legacies [of the Vietnam War]. To my mind the principal 
lesson learned is that we should never go into combat if 
it isn't important enough to our national interests.,,22 
In a speech eleven days after Weinberger's 
pronouncement, Secretary of State George Schultz replied to 
it skeptically, saying, "There is no such thing as 
guaranteed public support in advance.,,23 President Reagan 
21 David Fromkin and James Chase, "What Are the Lessons 
of Vietnam?", Foreign Affairs. (Spring 1985), 730. 
22 Willenson, 393. 
23 Fromkin and Chase, 730. 
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did not publicly comment on the policy, but his actions 
seemed to endorse it. During eight years in office his only 
deployments of American troops were of a relatively small 
scale, sending several hundred Marines to Beirut and then 
invading the tiny island of Grenada, both in 1983. Reagan 
also retaliated against various Middle Eastern terrorists 
with swift, surgical strikes. When the Beirut adventure 
soured, over 200 Marines being killed by a suicide car bomb, 
Reagan quickly withdrew the remaining forces. In Grenada, 
the odds for success were great and the victory accomplished 
in a matter of weeks. To contain Communism on a larger 
scale, Reagan relied on foreign soldiers, supplying 
substantial anti-Communist movements in Nicaragua and 
Afghanistan. Americans did not playa combat role in 
either war. 
This strategy had roots in the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, 
which was tied to Nixon's policy of Vietnamization, or 
turning the fighting back over to the South Vietnamese while 
gradually withdrawing American forces. In his book No More 
Vietnams, Nixon wrote, "I realized that after our experience 
in Vietnam the American people would be very reluctant to 
commit American forces to another war in the Third World 
..•. We should provide military and economic aid to the 
target countries equal to that provided to the insurgents by 
the Soviet bloc, but the country under attack should have 
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the responsibility for providing the men for its defense 
. . We should never again make the mistake we made in 
Vietnam. "24 Caspar Weinberger apparently felt the same way. 
Richard Holbrooke, a former executive aide to Ambassadors to 
South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge and Maxwell Taylor, noted 
that Weinberger's insistence on political support and fast, 
effective force "come precisely out of his understanding of 
Vietnam. He wouldn't have thought of those two things 
twenty or thirty years ago. Now they carry great weight and 
he raises them to argue for limits on involvement."Z5 
Journalist Robert Wright commented on the Weinberger 
Doctrine cynically: "Reagan, we are told, showed in Grenada 
and Libya [in response to alleged terrorism] that he was 
willing to see tens of Americans die for American ideals, 
and he showed in Afghanistan and Nicaragua that he was 
willing to pay tens of thousands of foreigners to die for 
them. "26 Writing in Harper's, Jonathan Schell struck a 
similar note: 
To be sure, whenever apparent toughness could be 
demonstrated without paying a high cost--as it could, 
for example, in the invasion of Grenada, or in the 
bombing of Libya in response to terrorist attacks 
allegedly planned in or supported by Libya--the 
administration acted, and the public applauded. But 
24 Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York: Arbor House, 
1985), 217-218. 
25 Willenson, 398. 
26 Robert Wright, New Republic, 9 January 1989, 6. 
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when intervention clearly had a high cost attached 
• the administration held back, and the public made 
no complaint. The line that the public did not wish to 
cross was clearly, if not nobly, drawn: the expenditure 
of the lives of people from other countries was 
acceptable; the expenditure of American lives was 
not . • . 
Strangely, after ten years of fighting in Vietnam 
and political turmoil at home, the war remained 
undigested in public opinion. The public was left in a 
state of unresolved ambivalence--repelled by the 
tangible prospect of any more Vietnams yet still 
attracted to the policies that led the United States 
into Vietnam. [1972 presidential candidate George] 
McGovern's political mistake had been to begin to 
articulate a picture of the world that reflected only 
one side of the public's ambivalence. President Carter, 
straying further down this path, won a McGovern-like 
reputation for weakness •••. Reagan was politically 
wiser. He followed to the letter the public preferences 
revealed in the latter days of the Vietnam War: he gave 
the public McGovernite decisions accompanied by Nixonian 
talk, and the public returned him to office in a 
landslide. 27 
Both Wright and Schell noted the importance of sparing 
American lives in pursuing a post-Vietnam foreign policy. 
While a majority of the voters may have supported Ronald 
Reagan's assertive policies, few were willing to have 
American troops used in large numbers, a reluctance that did 
not escape the attention of Caspar Weinberger. According to 
him, America should avoid conflicts like the one in Vietnam 
unless they were truly important to the national interest. 
In forgetting or never even learning the Vietnam War's 
political history, Americans silently commented on how 
27 Jonathan Schell, "Talk Loudly And Carry A Small Stick, " 
Harper's (March 1989), 46-47. 
96 
important Vietnam was to them. They remembered instead the 
war's effects on their countrymen, a personal rather than a 
political memory. But on a national scale, personal 
remembrance made a political imprint. The emphasis on what 
the war had done to individual Americans was a restraint on 
policymakers in Washington. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the American mind from 1975 to 1985, the Vietnam War 
was half a memory. The war's effects on Americans, their 
nation's foreign policies and prestige were remembered, its 
political history and the nation of Vietnam were not. The 
war's tangible purpose of preserving an independent, 
non-Communist South Vietnam was quickly forgotten, though 
the abstract purpose of containing Communism was remembered 
and preserved, witness the policies of Ronald Reagan, who 
modified containment to avoid any high cost in American 
lives. While it would seem as though containment in general 
had been important, Vietnam in particular was not truly so. 
Thus, the loss of Vietnam was easily forgotten, as was the 
political history of American efforts to prevent it. 
Americans wanted to forget the war because it was an 
unpleasant, complicated affair. They were able to forget 
because not only did the distant war fail to touch most of 
them indelibly, many seemed to consider its goal 
unessential. A small nation--on the other side of the 
world, with no ties of culture, language or geography to the 
United States--was lost to Communism and Americans got on 
with their lives. Their concerns tended to be immediate and 
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personal. 
It is the conclusion of this study that Americans 
remembered the Vietnam War as well as could be expected, or 
perhaps even better. Since Vietnam was not dear to the 
hearts of most Americans, naturally the history of America's 
involvement there was forgotten or never even learned by 
most. In fact, it was probably no more forgotten than were 
earlier wars fought for reasons other than national 
survival, for example, the Korean War. Indeed, since the 
Vietnam War was controversial and lost, certain of its 
aspects may have been remembered with unusual clarity, 
humanitarian ones, especially. The war was remembered in a 
strongly humanitarian way because the few who 
remembered--most of them Vietnam veterans, the bulk of the 
minority touched by the war--did so personally, avoiding 
political abstractions. In most of the veterans' written 
accounts neither the Vietnamese nor the war's political 
history was forgotten, but these writings tended to look 
inward. Alienated from politics and global strategy, the 
authors told their own stories with an emphasis on 
concrete detail. They were intent on showing the war as it 
really was, for themselves, anyway. Such personalized 
history was not new, having had roots in previous modern 
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wars, the First World War most prominently, but it struck a 
chord after the Vietnam War because the war's political 
history was not much recounted and so there was a void to 
fill. Mainly, the personal approach was honest 
self-reflection, not xenophobic self-absorption. It did, 
however, set a pattern for remembering the war. Americans 
looked in the mirror, not across the Pacific and into the 
rice paddies. 
When the American public finally remembered the Vietnam 
experience at the end of the 1970s, prodded by veterans 
demanding recognition, the focus was on the warrior, not the 
war. Again, the fate of Vietnam was not foremost in the 
national memory. Again, political history was shunned. 
Personal remembrance took its place, most notably in the 
Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, a sort of expense 
statement of American lives. It is probably true that a 
political memorial could not have been built, for agreement 
on its message could not have been reached, but more telling 
is that an apolitical memorial was in fact built. In other 
words, the nation was able to remember the war with an 
official expression that avoided politics. A Vietnam War 
memorial was never built; a memorial to veterans was. 
Surely this indicates how little Americans truly cared about 
the tangible political purpose of the war--preserving South 
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Vietnam. On this point semantics are important. Americans 
cared about the Vietnam War because it was a battlegound in 
the larger effort to contain Communism; it was a test of 
American will and prestige and it claimed so many American 
lives. But Americans did not seem to care so much about the 
nation of Vietnam, the human reality versus the political 
abstraction. 
Ironically, perhaps, the abstraction of containment was 
not forgotten or abandoned after 1975, but rather modified 
to lower the cost in American lives. Richard Nixon began 
this modification in 1969 with his Nixon Doctrine and it 
reached full flower under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, as 
evidenced by the Weinberger Doctrine. American lives 
would not be expended in great numbers for anything less 
than a vital cause, one which enjoyed full public support. 
As Caspar Weinberger noted, after 1975 Americans were loathe 
to commit troops overseas, an acknowledgement on his part 
that the manner in which the war was remembered had much to 
do with official policy. Personal remembrance, its 
attention to individual lives and sufferings, acted to 
restrain policymakers from foreign adventures. 
This particular legacy of personal remembrance would 
seem to refute the criticisms of people like W.D. Ehrhart, 
who found the Vietnam Veterans Memorial too vague and 
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ambivalent, not a strong enough warning about war, and Tim 
O'Brien, who wrote, "Fuzzily, we recall the outlines of and 
the bare silhouettes of the issues, but we do not, I fear, 
recall much of the detail. • The national memory, like 
the memory of soldiers, is too damn short."l As reflected 
in the Weinberger Doctrine, memory had a concrete effect. 
It is important as well in answering the conservative case 
that the memorial, and the war's "radical personalization" 
in general, was inappropriate. The opposite of radical 
personalization would be radical "abtracting," a description 
some might apply to the thinking which led America into 
Vietnam in the first place. In remembering the Vietnam War, 
Americans did not abandon containment in the abstract, but 
they were unwilling to secure it with American blood, for it 
was not the abstraction which made the war such a grim 
memory, it was the reality of over 57,000 American deaths. 
Jimmy Carter was wary of containment and did not pursue it 
forcefully for most of his term, but Ronald Reagan was 
determined to resuscitate it. In doing so, he was forced by 
the public's memory of the war to be imaginative, to choose 
his battles wisely and keep the costs low. There is a case 
to be made that Reagan succeeded, playing the role of 
post-Vietnam Commander in Chief skillfully, with prudence. 
I Horne, 206. 
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Certain of Reagan's fellow conservatives, Norman Podhoretz 
most notably, did not seem to share his realism and 
political instincts. Even after the war they continued 
their radical abstracting by saying that although the war 
was strategically unsound, it was a moral and noble 
undertaking and thus a good idea. To them, it seems, the 
thousands of names on Maya Lin's wall were the true 
abstraction, while notions of containment and dominoes were 
as real as flesh. 
Both the political right and left remembered the war in 
moral terms. The left's moral argument was expressed by, 
among others, a writer and Vietnam veteran named Daniel 
Swain, who was scathing in his words: 
I know, I know, I'm being insensitive to those poor 
Vietnam vets who have to live with the terrible guilt of 
what they did. I've read the stories about the poor SOB 
who can't look at his darling children without wanting 
to break into tears because he blew away a little 
Vietnamese child about the same age so many years ago. 
Perhaps part of the reason I .don't sympathize is that I 
am one of those vets. But the fact is, isn't that what 
we should feel, mind-torturing guilt for the rest of our 
lives? Can't anyone see that we deserve to feel guilty? 
Doesn't anyone see that the entire ball of 
rationalization that we built for ourselves--we were 
only nineteen, we thought we were fighting a war of 
liberation, we believed in our country--is just so much 
bullshit? Nineteen or not, we made a choice that 
revealed to us our basic inhumanity, and even if we 
never willingly killed little kids, in the final 
analysis we participated in an enormously immoral act, 
and the guilt we feel is a reasonable response to our 
acts. We should be forgiven, but we shouldn't expect 
to hear 'that's okay,' because the fact is it wasn't and 
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never should be t okay. ' ,, 2 
In the New York Times, Adam Clymer wrote, "We seem to 
be inclined to forgive ourselves for having gone there, 
inclined also to say if things didn't work out, it wasn't 
our fault.,,3 Clark Clifford, Secretary of Defense for 
Lyndon Johnson, said as much in a 1981 interview: 
"Countries, like human beings, make mistakes. We made an 
honest mistake. I feel no sense of shame. Nor should the 
country feel any sense of shame. We felt that we were doing 
what was necessary. It proved to be unsound."t As Saigon 
was falling in April 1975, Secretary of Defense James 
Schlesinger sent a message to members of the American armed 
forces, saying, " •.• our involvement. was intended to 
assist a small nation to preserve its independence in the 
face of external attack and to provide at least a resaonable 
h f . 1 ,,5 c ance 0 surV1va. 
Norman Podhoretz put the conservative moral argument 
thus: "Why did the United States undertake these burdens and 
2 Daniel Swain, "Brothers In Arms: The Death Of An 
Antiwar Veteran," Unwinding The War, Reese Williams, ed. 
(Seattle: Real Comet Press, 1987), 108. 
a Clymer, 42. 
4 Timothy J. Lomperis, The War Nobody Won (Washington, 
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 20-21. 
5 Emerson, 36. 
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make these sacrifices of blood and treasure and domestic 
tranquility? What was in it for the United States? It was 
a question that plagued the antiwar movement from beginning 
to end because the answer was hard to find."6 He added, 
"Imprudent though it might have been to try to save South 
Vietnam from Communism, it was also an attempt born of 
noble impulses. The same cannot be said of what the United 
States did in abandoning South Vietnam to Communism in 
1972."1 
Very generally, the left and the right said the same 
thing: America had treated Vietnam shabbily, immorally. 
According to the left, America had entered Vietnam 
arrogantly, deluded by notions of global mission and 
ignorant of the people she was supposedly trying to save. 
In the course of trying, unspeakable damage was done. 
According to the right, America had made a solemn vow to 
save South Vietnam and then abandoned her in her hour of 
need. Both versions implied that mighty, western America 
was unkind to her frail Asian ally. 
Whether the Vietnam War should have been remembered as 
a moral failure is a question for other studies to answer. 
Relevant to this study is that while most Americans seemed 
6 Podhoretz, 196. 
Ibid., 172. 
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to have had some moral qualms about the war--a survey in 
1982 showed that 72 percent felt the war was "more than a 
mistake" and was "fundamentally wrong and immoral"S--a 
national debate on the episode's morality never took place 
after 1975. At a roundtable discussion of the war in 1985, 
Peter Marin said the war as a "moral event" had been lost in 
memory. "That's an immense waste," said Marin. "We could 
perhaps have become a wiser people. But the war is an 
experience that is not becoming part of the collective 
wisdom." To which conservative economist George Gilder 
pointedly replied, "Americans are getting on with their 
lives, in other words. ,,9 
Both Marin and Gilder were half right. Marin was right 
in noting how the morality of America's relationship with 
Vietnam was not much remembered. If America had mistreated 
her ally, the public memory of the war did not clearly 
reflect it, just as it did not reflect the war's political 
history. Gilder was right in implying that after 1975 
Americans avoided recriminations, ideological battles and 
self-flagellation, though some believed the latter 
flourished, witness Ronald Reagan's stinging response to 
Jimmy Carter's description of the war as "moral poverty." 
8 MacPherson, 27. 
9 Harper's, (April 1985), 44. 
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However, Marin failed to mention that in remembering the war 
personally, in focusing so intently on what it did to 
individuals, Americans showed a moral side, one which duly 
considered the horrors of war. For his part, Gilder failed 
to mention that in "getting on with their lives" Americans 
forgot about their lost ally, an amoral reaction at best. 
The American memory was for the American experience, not for 
that of the Vietnamese. 
This amorality would seem to have been the least 
defensible part of the war's memory. Again, it is the 
conclusion of this study that Americans remembered the war 
reasonably well. Despite forgetting its history and the 
people it was fought to save from Communism, Americans did 
remember the war's costs vividly enough to inhibit national 
leaders from launching similar adventures. Realistically, 
perhaps reflecting upon what the war had done to their own 
kind was a sufficiently moral beginning for Americans to 
make. If it was an act of self-absorption, it probably said 
more about human nature in general than about the American 
character in particular. Judgment on this, it seems, would 
depend on one's moral expectations. 
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